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The Value of Benchmarking

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Author Info
Dirk Bergemann () (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)
Ulrich Hege (JEC School of Management)

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Abstract

We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic model with multiple research stages, where time and investment needed to meet each benchmark are unknown. The allocation of funds is subject moral hazard. The optimal contract provides for incentive payments linked to attaining the next benchmark, which must be increasing in the funding horizon of each stage. Benchmarking reduces agency costs, directly by shortening the agent's guaranteed funding horizon, and indirectly via an implicit incentive effect of information rents in future financing rounds. The ex ante need to provide incentives and the venture capitalist's desire to cut information rents ex post create a hold-up conflict, which can be overcome by providing all funds in every stage in a single up-front payment. Empirical patterns of the evolution of financing rounds and research intensity over the lifetime of a project are explained as optimal choices: the optimal capital allocated and the funding horizon are increasing from one stage to the next. This emphasizes the notion that early stages are the riskiest in an innovative venture.

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File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d13b/d1379.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 1379.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2002
Date of revision: Oct 2002
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1379

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Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

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Related research
Keywords: Venture financing; Optimal stopping; Benchmarking; Stage financing; Abandonment option;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing
G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Investment Policy

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bergemann, Dirk & Hege, Ulrich, 2001. "The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping," CEPR Discussion Papers 2763, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Schmidt, Klaus M., 1999. "Convertible Securities and Venture Capital Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2317, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Qian, Yingyi & Xu, Chenggang, 1998. "Innovation and Bureaucracy under Soft and Hard Budget Constraints," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 65(1), pages 151-64, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bergemann, Dirk & Hege, Ulrich, 1998. "Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(6-8), pages 703-735, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2001. "Organizational Design of R&D activities," CSEF Working Papers 60, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2003. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. John H. Cochrane, 2001. "The Risk and Return of Venture Capital," NBER Working Papers 8066, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Elitzur, Ramy & Gavious, Arieh, 2003. "A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 440-453, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Thomas Hellmann, 1998. "The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 57-76, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. GIOT, Pierre & SCHWIENBACHER, Armin, 2005. "IPOs, trade sales and liquidations: modelling venture capital exits using survival analysis," CORE Discussion Papers 2005013, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka & Takalo, Tuomas & Kultti, Klaus, 2006. "The role of comparing in financial markets with hidden information," Research Discussion Papers 1/2006, Bank of Finland. [Downloadable!]
  3. Juha-Pekka Niinimäki & Tuomas Takalo, 2007. "Benchmarking and Comparing Entrepreneurs with Incomplete Information," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 20(2), pages 91-107, Autumn. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-12.


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