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Aggregation and dissemination of information in experimental asset markets in the presence of a manipulator

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Author Info
Helena Veiga ()
Marc Vorsatz ()

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Abstract

We study with the help of a laboratory experiment the conditions under which an uninformed manipulator - a robot trader that unconditionally buys several shares of a common value asset in the beginning of a trading period and unwinds this position later on - is able to induce higher asset prices. We find that the average contract price is significantly higher in the presence of the manipulator if, and only if, the asset takes the lowest possible value and insiders have perfect information about the true value of the asset. It is also evidenced that the robot trader makes trading gains; i.e., independently on whether the informed traders have perfect or partial information, it earns always more than the average trader. Finally, not only uninformed subjects suffer from the presence of the robot trader, but also some of the imperfectly informed insiders have lower payoffs once the robot trader is added as a market participant.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Estadística y Econometría in its series Statistics and Econometrics Working Papers with number ws084110.

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Date of creation: Sep 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cte:wsrepe:ws084110

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Related research
Keywords: Asset market; Experiment; Price manipulation; Rational expectations;

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Colin F. Camerer, 1998. "Can Asset Markets Be Manipulated? A Field Experiment with Racetrack Betting," Natural Field Experiments 0026, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
  2. Veiga, Helena & Vorsatz, Marc, 2006. "Price Manipulation in an Experimental Asset Market," Research Memoranda 024, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Colin F. Camerer, 1998. "Can Asset Markets Be Manipulated? A Field Experiment with Racetrack Betting," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(3), pages 457-482, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Plott, Charles R & Sunder, Shyam, 1982. "Efficiency of Experimental Security Markets with Insider Information: An Application of Rational-Expectations Models," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(4), pages 663-98, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Hanson, Robin & Oprea, Ryan & Porter, David, 2006. "Information aggregation and manipulation in an experimental market," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 449-459, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Allen, Franklin & Gale, Douglas, 1992. "Stock-Price Manipulation," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 503-29. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 992-1026, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, 2004. "Prediction Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 107-126, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Camerer, Colin, 1996. "Can Asset Markets be Manipulated? A Field Experiment with Racetrack Betting," Working Papers 983, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  10. Sunder, Shyam, 1992. "Market for Information: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(3), pages 667-95, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Noeth, Markus & Camerer, Colin F. & Plott, Charles R. & Webber, Martin, 1999. "Information Aggregation in Experimental Asset Markets: Traps and Misaligned Beliefs," Working Papers 1060, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  12. Mark Bagnoli & Barton L. Lipman, 1996. "Stock Price Manipulation Through Takeover Bids," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 124-147, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Itay Goldstein & Alexander Guembel, 2008. "Manipulation and the Allocational Role of Prices," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 75(1), pages 133-164, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Forsythe, Robert & Palfrey, Thomas R & Plott, Charles R, 1982. "Asset Valuation in an Experimental Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(3), pages 537-67, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Marco Ottaviani & Peter Norman Sørensen, 2007. "Outcome Manipulation in Corporate Prediction Markets," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(2-3), pages 554-563, 04-05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Benabou, Roland & Laroque, Guy, 1992. "Using Privileged Information to Manipulate Markets: Insiders, Gurus, and Credibility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 921-58, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1991. "Information Mirages in Experimental Asset Markets," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(4), pages 463-93, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Kumar, Praveen & Seppi, Duane J, 1992. " Futures Manipulation with "Cash Settlement."," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1485-502, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Archishman Chakraborty & Bilge Yilmaz, 2008. "Microstructure Bluffing with Nested Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(2), pages 280-84, May. [Downloadable!]
  20. Chakraborty, Archishman & Yilmaz, Bilge, 2004. "Informed manipulation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 132-152, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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