Knowledge disclosure as intellectual property rights
AbstractWe study a model in which an inventor discloses knowledge about its innovation and then a rival chooses the probability of attaining a competing invention. Disclosures, by creating prior art, diminish the probability that the rival has of receiving a patent for its invention (legal externality), but, by revealing knowledge, they decrease the marginal cost of R&D (knowledge externality). We stress the following result. If the knowledge externality is large compared to the legal externality, decreasing the patentability standards leads to fewer disclosures and may hinder R&D. We also determine the impact of changes in market payoffs on the equilibrium level of disclosures and R&D.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía in its series Economics Working Papers with number we077140.
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-12-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-INO-2007-12-01 (Innovation)
- NEP-IPR-2007-12-01 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-KNM-2007-12-01 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)
- NEP-MIC-2007-12-01 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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