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Semiparametric Estimation of First-price Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders

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Author Info
Sandra Campo ; Emmanuel Guerre ; Isabelle Perrigne ; Quang Vuong (Crest)

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Paper provided by Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique in its series Working Papers with number 2003-09.

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Date of creation: Sep 2003
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Handle: RePEc:crs:wpaper:2003-09

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Keywords: optimal matching;

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  1. Patrick Bajari & Han Hong & Ahmed Khwaja, 2006. "Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Health Expenditures: A Semiparametric Analysis," NBER Working Papers 12445, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Paul Pezanis-Christou & Andres Romeu, 2002. "Structural Inferences from First-Price Auction Experiments," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 531.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  3. Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006. "Empirical Models of Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001045, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Harry J. Paarsch & Jacques Robert, 2003. "Testing Equilibrium Behaviour At First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auctions With Discrete Bid Increments," CIRANO Working Papers 2003s-32, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  5. Olivier Armantier and Erwann Sbai, 2003. "Estimation and Comparison of Treasury Auction Formats when Bidders are Asymmetric," Department of Economics Working Papers 03-02, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Patrick Bajari & Stephanie Houghton & Steve Tadelis, 2006. "Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers 12051, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Lu, Jingfeng & Perrigne, Isabelle, 2006. "Estimating risk aversion from ascending and sealed-bid auctions: the case of timber auction data," MPRA Paper 948, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Reiss, Peter C. & Wolak, Frank A., 2003. "Structural Econometric Modeling: Rationales and Examples from Industrial Organization," Research Papers 1831, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
  9. Laurent Lamy, 2008. "The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders," PSE Working Papers 2008-64, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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