Religious Identity, Public Goods and Centralization: Evidence from Russian and Israeli Cities
AbstractIn this paper, we analyze the effects of religious identity – defined both as personal identification with a religious tradition and institutional ideas on the provision of public goods – on attitudes toward central government. We explore whether citizens belonging to collectivist rather than individualist religious denominations are more likely to evaluate their central government positively. Moreover, we explore whether adherence to collectivist norms of economic and political organization leads to a positive evaluation of central government. Surveys were conducted in Russia and Israel as these countries provide a mosaic of three major world religions – Judaism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Sunni Islam. The information gathered also allows us to study whether attitudes towards religious institutions such as the Russian Orthodox Church, the Chief Rabbinate in Jerusalem, the Jerusalem Islamic Waqf, and the Greek-Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem in Israel are able to predict positive attitudes toward centralized forms of governance. We find strong support for the proposition that collectivist norms and an institutional religious identity enhance positive attitudes towards central government.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2013-14.
Date of creation: Aug 2013
Date of revision:
Religious identity; public goods; collectivism; individualism; local government; centralization; Russia; Israel;
Other versions of this item:
- Grigoriadis, Theocharis & Torgler, Benno, 2013. "Religious identity, public goods and centralization: Evidence from Russian and Israeli cities," Discussion Papers 2013/13, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
- Benno Torgler & Theocharis Grigoriadis, 2013. "Religious Identity, Public Goods and Centralization: Evidence from Russian and Israeli Cities," QuBE Working Papers 018, QUT Business School.
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
- P17 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Performance and Prospects
- P21 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
- P35 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Public Finance
- P51 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
- P52 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Studies of Particular Economies
- Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-08-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-CIS-2013-08-31 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-NPS-2013-08-31 (Nonprofit & Public Sector)
- NEP-PBE-2013-08-31 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2013-08-31 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2013-08-31 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
- NEP-TRA-2013-08-31 (Transition Economics)
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