Cyclical Adjustment of Capital Requirements: A Simple Framework
AbstractWe present a simple model of an economy with heterogeneous banks that may be funded with uninsured deposits and equity capital. Capital serves to ameliorate a moral hazard problem in the choice of risk. There is a fixed aggregate supply of bank capital, so the cost of capital is endogenous. A regulator sets risk-sensitive capital requirements in order to maximize a social welfare function that incorporates a social cost of bank failure. We consider the effect of a negative shock to the supply of bank capital and show that optimal capital requirements should be lowered. Failure to do so would keep banks safer but produce a large reduction in aggregate investment. The result provides a rationale for the cyclical adjustment of risk-sensitive capital requirements.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 9008.
Date of creation: Jun 2012
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Other versions of this item:
- Repullo, Rafael, 2013. "Cyclical adjustment of capital requirements: A simple framework," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 608-626.
- Rafael Repullo, 2012. "Cyclical Adjustment Of Capital Requirements A Simple Framework," Working Papers wp2012_1205, CEMFI.
- E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2012-06-25 (Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2012-06-25 (Macroeconomics)
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