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Money is an Experience Good: Competition and Trust in the Private Provision of Money

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  • Marimon, Ramon
  • Nicolini, Juan Pablo
  • Teles, Pedro

Abstract

We study the interplay between competition and trust as efficiency-enhancing mechanims in the private provision of money. With commitment, trust is automatically achieved and competition ensures efficiency. Without commitment, competition plays no role. Trust does play a role but requires a lower bound on efficiency. Stationary inflation must be positive and, therefore, the Friedman rule cannot be achieved. The quality of money can only be observed after its purchasing capacity is realized. In that sense money is an experience good. We show that the two problems, the time-inconsistency in the private provision of money and moral-hazard in the provision of experience goods, are isomorphic, and therefore the same results are attained in both settings.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 7418.

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Date of creation: Aug 2009
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7418

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Keywords: Currency competition; Experience goods; Inflation; Trust;

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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Trust in private money
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2011-08-19 14:11:00
  2. Money is an Experience Good: Competition and Trust in the Private Provision of Money
    by Christian Zimmermann in NEP-DGE blog on 2012-05-20 02:18:16
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
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Cited by:
  1. Dwyer, Gerald P, 2014. "The Economics of Private Digital Currency," MPRA Paper 55824, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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