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Pensions with Heterogenous Individuals and Endogenous Fertility

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Author Info
Cremer, Helmuth
Gahvari, Firouz
Pestieau, Pierre

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Abstract

This paper studies the design of pension schemes in a society where fertility is endogenous and parents differ in their ability to raise children. In a world with perfect information, a pay-as-you-go social security system is characterized by equal pensions for all but different contributions which may or may not increase with the number of children. Additionally, fertility must be subsidized at the margin to correct for the externality that accompanies fertility. In a world of asymmetric information, incentive-related distortions supplement the Pigouvian subsidy. These may either require an additional subsidy or an offsetting tax on fertility depending on whether the redistribution is towards people with more or less children. In the former case, pensions are decreasing in the number of children: in the latter case, they are increasing.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 5553.

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Date of creation: Mar 2006
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5553

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Related research
Keywords: adverse selection; fertility; pensions;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Robert Fenge & Volker Meier, 2003. "Pensions and Fertility Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Paul A. Samuelson, 1958. "An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest with or without the Social Contrivance of Money," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 66, pages 467. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2004. "The pay-as-you-go pension system as fertility insurance and an enforcement device," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(7-8), pages 1335-1357, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Cigno, Alessandro & Luporini, Annalisa & Pettini, Anna, 2003. "Transfers to families with children as a principal-agent problem," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(5-6), pages 1165-1177, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Bental, Benjamin, 1989. "The Old Age Security Hypothesis and Optimal Population Growth," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 285-301.
  6. CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre & GAHVARI, Firouz, 2004. "Pensions with endogenous and stochastic fertility," CORE Discussion Papers 2004067, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Alessandro Cigno & Annalisa Luporini & Anna Pettini, 2004. "Hidden information problems in the design of family allowances," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 645-655, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 2004. "The pay-as-you-go pension system as fertility insurance and an enforcement device," Discussion Papers in Economics 938, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. van Groezen, Bas & Leers, Theo & Meijdam, Lex, 2003. "Social security and endogenous fertility: pensions and child allowances as siamese twins," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 233-251, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Helmuth Cremer & Firouz Gahvari & Pierre Pestieau, 2003. "Stochastic fertility, moral hazard, and the design of pay-as-you-go pension plans," DELTA Working Papers 2003-21, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
  11. Ab O, G. & Mahieu, G. & Patxot, C., 2004. "On the optimality of PAYG pension systems in an endogenous fertility setting," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(01), pages 35-62, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. PESTIEAU, Pierre & PONTHIéRE, GrŽgory & SATO, Motohiro, 2006. "Longevity and Pay-as-you-Go pensions," CORE Discussion Papers 2006054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
  2. CREMER, Helmuth & GAHVARI, Firouz & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2004. "Pensions with Endogenous and Stochastic Fertility," IDEI Working Papers 305, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Bas Groezen & Lex Meijdam, 2008. "Growing old and staying young: population policy in an ageing closed economy," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 573-588, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Volker Meier & Matthias Wrede, 2005. "Pension, Fertility, and Education," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  5. Gaggermeier, Christian, 2006. "Pension and children : Pareto improvement with heterogeneous preferences," IAB Discussion Paper 200603, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany]. [Downloadable!]
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