IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/15180.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Beyond Pangloss: Financial sector origins of inefficient economic booms

Author

Listed:
  • McMahon, Michael
  • Malherbe, Frédéric

Abstract

Government guarantees to banks are ubiquitous. We study an equilibrium model where, in the presence of such guarantees, the equilibrium allocation can be characterised as Panglossian: it corresponds to that of a deterministic economy where the best possible state always occurs. However, GDP is inefficiently high and expected consumption inefficiently low. Financial sophistication magnifies this distortion, taking the allocation beyond the Panglossian outcome (i.e. with even higher GDP and even lower expected consumption). We argue that this mechanism is empirically relevant for advanced economies and suggest that the Great Recession, partly, reversed a Great Distortion.

Suggested Citation

  • McMahon, Michael & Malherbe, Frédéric, 2020. "Beyond Pangloss: Financial sector origins of inefficient economic booms," CEPR Discussion Papers 15180, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15180
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://cepr.org/publications/DP15180
    Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nicholas Crafts, 2019. "The Fall in Potential Output due to the Financial Crisis: A Much Bigger Estimate for the UK," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 61(4), pages 625-635, December.
    2. Rafael Repullo & Javier Suarez, 2013. "The Procyclical Effects of Bank Capital Regulation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(2), pages 452-490.
    3. Thomas Philippon, 2015. "Has the US Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory and Measurement of Financial Intermediation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(4), pages 1408-1438, April.
    4. Matthew Rognlie & Andrei Shleifer & Alp Simsek, 2018. "Investment Hangover and the Great Recession," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 113-153, April.
    5. Nicholas Oulton, 2013. "Has the Growth of Real GDP in the UK Been Overstated Because of Mismeasurement of Banking Output?," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 224(1), pages 59-65, May.
    6. Charles W. Calomiris & Stephen H. Haber, 2015. "Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10177-2.
    7. Moritz Schularick & Alan M. Taylor, 2012. "Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870-2008," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 1029-1061, April.
    8. Fatás, Antonio & Summers, Lawrence H., 2018. "The permanent effects of fiscal consolidations," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 238-250.
    9. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2014. "This Time is Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 15(2), pages 215-268, November.
    10. Martin L. Weitzman, 1976. "On the Welfare Significance of National Product in a Dynamic Economy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 90(1), pages 156-162.
    11. Frederic Malherbe, 2020. "Optimal Capital Requirements over the Business and Financial Cycles," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 139-174, July.
    12. Robert E. Hall, 2011. "The Long Slump," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 431-469, April.
    13. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    14. Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, 2009. "Varieties of Crises and Their Dates," Introductory Chapters, in: This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton University Press.
    15. Matthew Rognlie, 2015. "Deciphering the Fall and Rise in the Net Capital Share," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 50(1 (Spring), pages 1-69.
    16. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    17. Merton, Robert C., 1977. "An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees An application of modern option pricing theory," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 3-11, June.
    18. McKinnon, Ronald I & Pill, Huw, 1997. "Credible Economic Liberalizations and Overborrowing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 189-193, May.
    19. Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1992. "Capital requirements and the behaviour of commercial banks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 1137-1170, June.
    20. Jihad Dagher, 2018. "Regulatory Cycles: Revisiting the Political Economy of Financial Crises," IMF Working Papers 2018/008, International Monetary Fund.
    21. Saleem Bahaj & Frederic Malherbe, 2020. "The Forced Safety Effect: How Higher Capital Requirements Can Increase Bank Lending," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(6), pages 3013-3053, December.
    22. François Gourio & Thomas H. Klier, 2015. "Recent Trends in Capital Accumulation and Implications for Investment," Chicago Fed Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    23. Crafts, Nicholas, 2019. "The Fall in UK Potential Output due to the Financial Crisis: a Much Bigger Estimate," CEPR Discussion Papers 13428, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    24. Laurence Ball, 2014. "Long-term damage from the Great Recession in OECD countries," European Journal of Economics and Economic Policies: Intervention, Edward Elgar Publishing, vol. 11(2), pages 149-160, September.
    25. Kareken, John H & Wallace, Neil, 1978. "Deposit Insurance and Bank Regulation: A Partial-Equilibrium Exposition," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 413-438, July.
    26. Borio, Claudio, 2014. "The financial cycle and macroeconomics: What have we learnt?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 182-198.
    27. Benjamin J. Keys & Tanmoy Mukherjee & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2010. "Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(1), pages 307-362.
    28. J. Bradford DeLong & Lawrence H. Summers, 2012. "Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 43(1 (Spring), pages 233-297.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Benjamin Hemingway, 2022. "Banking Regulation and Collateral Screening in a Model of Information Asymmetry," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 61(3), pages 367-405, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Frederic Malherbe, 2020. "Optimal Capital Requirements over the Business and Financial Cycles," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(3), pages 139-174, July.
    2. van Eeghen, Piet-Hein, 2021. "Funding money-creating banks: Cash funding, balance sheet funding and the moral hazard of currency elasticity," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    3. van der Kwaak, Christiaan & Madeira, João & Palma, Nuno, 2023. "The long-run effects of risk: an equilibrium approach," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 153(C).
    4. Claudio Borio, 2011. "Rediscovering the Macroeconomic Roots of Financial Stability Policy: Journey, Challenges, and a Way Forward," Annual Review of Financial Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 3(1), pages 87-117, December.
    5. Thomas Philippon, 2015. "Has the US Finance Industry Become Less Efficient? On the Theory and Measurement of Financial Intermediation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(4), pages 1408-1438, April.
    6. Ebrahimi Kahou, Mahdi & Lehar, Alfred, 2017. "Macroprudential policy: A review," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 92-105.
    7. Gabriel Jiménez & Steven Ongena & José‐Luis Peydró & Jesús Saurina, 2014. "Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty‐Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk‐Taking?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 82(2), pages 463-505, March.
    8. Brunnermeier, Markus K. & Oehmke, Martin, 2013. "Bubbles, Financial Crises, and Systemic Risk," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 1221-1288, Elsevier.
    9. Nuno Coimbra & Hélène Rey, 2017. "Financial Cycles with Heterogeneous Intermediaries," NBER Working Papers 23245, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Jeremy C. Stein, 2021. "Can Policy Tame the Credit Cycle?," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 69(1), pages 5-22, March.
    11. Giampaolo Gabbi & Alesia Kalbaska & Alessandro Vercelli, 2014. "Factors generating and transmitting the financial crisis: The role of incentives: securitization and contagion," Working papers wpaper56, Financialisation, Economy, Society & Sustainable Development (FESSUD) Project.
    12. Vadim Elenev & Tim Landvoigt & Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, 2021. "A Macroeconomic Model With Financially Constrained Producers and Intermediaries," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(3), pages 1361-1418, May.
    13. Borsi, Mihály Tamás, 2018. "Credit contractions and unemployment," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 573-593.
    14. Guillermo A. Calvo, 2013. "The Mayekawa Lecture: Puzzling over the Anatomy of Crises- Liquidity and the Veil of Finance," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 31, pages 39-64, November.
    15. Guillermo Calvo, 2013. "Puzzling over the Anatomy of Crises: Liquidity and the Veil of Finance," IMES Discussion Paper Series 13-E-09, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan.
    16. Michael Junho Lee, 2018. "Uncertain booms and fragility," Staff Reports 861, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    17. Anjan V. Thakor, 2023. "Finance research: What are the new frontiers?," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 453-462, August.
    18. Stijn Claessens & M Ayhan Kose, 2018. "Frontiers of macrofinancial linkages," BIS Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 95.
    19. Committee, Nobel Prize, 2022. "Financial Intermediation and the Economy," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2022-2, Nobel Prize Committee.
    20. Milton Harris & Christian Opp & Marcus Opp, 2020. "The Aggregate Demand for Bank Capital," NBER Working Papers 27858, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Investment; Capital; Intangible Capital; Capacity
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15180. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.