IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cor/louvco/2006074.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Limiting the number of charities

Author

Listed:
  • PESTIEAU, Pierre
  • SATO, Motohiro

Abstract

We consider a model where creating a charity implies a fixed cost and individual contributions depend on how close donors feel with respect to the charity. In that setting we show that there are an optimal number of charities and an optimal rate of subsidization that depend on the set-up cost and on the attachment of donors to charities that share the same values as theirs. We also consider the case of free-entry and compare it with the second-best solution controlling for the number of charities.

Suggested Citation

  • PESTIEAU, Pierre & SATO, Motohiro, 2006. "Limiting the number of charities," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2006074, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2006074
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://sites.uclouvain.be/core/publications/coredp/coredp2006.html
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-1056.
    2. Barla, P. & Pestieau, P., 2005. "The Optimal Number of Charities," Cahiers de recherche 0501, GREEN.
    3. Verdier, Thierry & Aldashev, Gani, 2007. "NGO Competition and the Markets for Development Donations," CEPR Discussion Papers 6350, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Scharf, Kimberley, 2010. "Entry and fixed costs in charitable sectors," CEPR Discussion Papers 7978, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Polborn Mattias K, 2008. "Competing for Recognition through Public Good Provision," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-25, September.
    3. Aldashev, Gani & Verdier, Thierry, 2010. "Goodwill bazaar: NGO competition and giving to development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 48-63, January.
    4. Krautheim, Sebastian & Verdier, Thierry, 2016. "Offshoring with endogenous NGO activism," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 22-41.
    5. Ly, Pierre & Mason, Geri, 2012. "Competition Between Microfinance NGOs: Evidence from Kiva," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 643-655.
    6. Verdier, Thierry & Aldashev, Gani, 2007. "Internationalization of NGOs and Competition on Markets for Development Donations," CEPR Discussion Papers 6511, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Barla, Philippe & Pestieau, Pierre, 2009. "Sur le nombre optimal d’organismes de bienfaisance," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 85(1), pages 5-11, mars.
    8. Verdier, Thierry & Aldashev, Gani, 2007. "NGO Competition and the Markets for Development Donations," CEPR Discussion Papers 6350, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Scharf, Kimberley, 2011. "Scale Scale Economies in Nonprofit Provision, Technology Adoption and Entry," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 45, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
    2. Sidney Turner & Richard Turner, 2011. "Capital cities: a special case in urban development," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 46(1), pages 19-35, February.
    3. Drèze, Jacques & Le Breton, Michel & Savvateev, Alexei & Weber, Shlomo, 2008. ""Almost" subsidy-free spatial pricing in a multi-dimensional setting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 275-291, November.
    4. Nir Dagan & Oscar Volij, 2000. "Formation of Nations in a Welfare‐State Minded World," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(2), pages 157-181, April.
    5. Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Marie-Laure Breuillé, 2023. "Citizen preferences and the architecture of government," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 61(3), pages 537-585, October.
    6. Clément Carbonnier, 2008. "Fiscal competition between decentralized jurisdictions, theoretical and empirical evidence," THEMA Working Papers 2008-17, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
    7. Pauline Grosjean & Claudia Senik, 2011. "Democracy, Market Liberalization, and Political Preferences," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 93(1), pages 365-381, February.
    8. Vincenzo Galasso, 2020. "Market Reactions to Quest for Decentralization and Independence: Evidence from Catalonia," CESifo Working Paper Series 8254, CESifo.
    9. Nadine Riedel & Martin Simmler, 2018. "Large and Influential: Firm Size and Governments' Corporate Tax Rate Choice," CESifo Working Paper Series 6904, CESifo.
    10. Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts, 2016. "Political autonomy and independence: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 28(3), pages 461-496, July.
    11. Ben Lockwood, 2008. "Voting, Lobbying, And The Decentralization Theorem," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 416-431, November.
    12. Haimanko, Ori & Le Breton, Michel & Weber, Shlomo, 2004. "Voluntary formation of communities for the provision of public projects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 1-34, March.
    13. Blesse, Sebastian & Diegmann, André, 2022. "The place-based effects of police stations on crime: Evidence from station closures," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).
    14. Federico Boffa & Amedeo Piolatto & Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto, 2016. "Political Centralization and Government Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 131(1), pages 381-422.
    15. Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2003. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2028, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    16. Roland Vaubel, 2013. "Secession in the European Union," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 288-302, October.
    17. Kevin Williams, 2021. "Does national income mediate the relationship between trade and government size?," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 61(6), pages 3029-3057, December.
    18. Guillaume Haeringer, 2000. "Stable Coalition Structures with Fixed Decision Schme," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 471.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    19. Hanes, Niklas, 2003. "Empirical Studies in Local Public Finance: Spillovers, Amalgamations, and Tactical Redistribution," Umeå Economic Studies 604, Umeå University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    charities; joy of giving;

    JEL classification:

    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2006074. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Alain GILLIS (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/coreebe.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.