IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cnb/rpnrpn/2022-02.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Disclosing Dissent in Monetary Policy Committees

Author

Listed:
  • Jan Filacek
  • Lucie Kokesova Matejkova

Abstract

Dissenting opinions in monetary policy meetings are a common phenomenon and an integral part of committee decisions, but not every central bank discloses them to the same degree. This paper discusses the pros and cons of the various degrees of transparency of 14 central banks in disclosing differences of opinion among committee members. It focuses on the experience of the Swedish Riksbank and the Czech National Bank, both of which publish attributed minutes of their boards' monetary policy meetings. We argue that attributed minutes, which the Czech National Bank started to publish in February 2020, have provided market participants and the public with an opportunity to better understand the board members' individual opinions and behaviour. It can also be argued that attributed minutes have benefited the board members themselves, as they give them more room to present and explain their arguments.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Filacek & Lucie Kokesova Matejkova, 2022. "Disclosing Dissent in Monetary Policy Committees," Research and Policy Notes 2022/02, Czech National Bank.
    • Handle: RePEc:cnb:rpnrpn:2022/02
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cnb.cz/export/sites/cnb/en/economic-research/.galleries/research_publications/irpn/download/rpn_2_2022.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Blinder, Alan S., 2007. "Monetary policy by committee: Why and how?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 106-123, March.
    2. Ehrmann, Michael & Blinder, Alan & De Haan, Jakob & ,, 2022. "Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope?," CEPR Discussion Papers 17441, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Thomas Lustenberger & Enzo Rossi, 2020. "Does Central Bank Transparency and Communication Affect Financial and Macroeconomic Forecasts?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(2), pages 153-201, March.
    4. David-Jan Jansen & Richhild Moessner, 2016. "Communicating dissent on monetary policy: Evidence from central bank minutes," DNB Working Papers 512, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    5. Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2013. "Is Transparency To No Avail?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(4), pages 967-994, October.
    6. EllenE. Meade & David Stasavage, 2008. "Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent: Evidence from the US Federal Reserve," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 695-717, April.
    7. Svensson, Lars E.O., 2009. "Transparency under Flexible Inflation Targeting: Experiences and Challenges," CEPR Discussion Papers 7213, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2012. "Information acquisition and transparency in committees," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(2), pages 427-453, May.
    9. Zeev Kril & David Leiser & Avia Spivak, 2016. "What Determines the Credibility of the Central Bank of Israel in the Public Eye?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 12(1), pages 67-93, March.
    10. Otmar Issing, 2005. "Communication, transparency, accountability: monetary policy in the twenty-first century," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 87(Mar), pages 65-83.
    11. Mr. Douglas Laxton & Charles Freedman, 2009. "Inflation Targeting Pillars - Transparency and Accountability," IMF Working Papers 2009/262, International Monetary Fund.
    12. El-Shagi, Makram & Jung, Alexander, 2015. "Have minutes helped markets to predict the MPC's monetary policy decisions?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 222-234.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mikael Apel & Carl Andreas Claussen & Petra Gerlach-Kristen & Petra Lennartsdotter & Øistein Røisland, 2013. "Monetary policy decisions – comparing theory and “inside” information from MPC members," Working Paper 2013/03, Norges Bank.
    2. Swank, Otto H. & Visser, Bauke, 2023. "Committees as active audiences: Reputation concerns and information acquisition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 221(C).
    3. Kedan, Danielle & Stuart, Rebecca, 2014. "Central Bank Communications: A Comparative Study," Quarterly Bulletin Articles, Central Bank of Ireland, pages 89-104, April.
    4. Rieder, Kilian, 2022. "Monetary policy decision-making by committee: Why, when and how it can work," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    5. Otto (O.H.) Swank & Bauke (B.) Visser, 2018. "Committees as Active Audiences: Reputation Concerns and Information Acquisition," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 18-068/VII, Tinbergen Institute, revised 01 May 2019.
    6. Mikael Apel & Marianna Blix Grimaldi & Isaiah Hull, 2022. "How Much Information Do Monetary Policy Committees Disclose? Evidence from the FOMC's Minutes and Transcripts," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(5), pages 1459-1490, August.
    7. Kedan, Danielle & Stuart, Rebecca, 2014. "Central Bank Minutes," Economic Letters 12/EL/14, Central Bank of Ireland.
    8. Ngomba Bodi, Francis Ghislain & Tadadjeu Wemba, Dessy-Karl & Soulemanou, Soulemanou, 2020. "Transparence des Banques Centrales et efficacité de la politique monétaire : quelles implications pour la Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale ? [Central Bank's Transparency and effectiveness of ," MPRA Paper 116436, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Fehrler, Sebastian & Hahn, Volker, 2020. "Committee Decision-Making under the Threat of Leaks," IZA Discussion Papers 13746, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. Balmaceda, Felipe, 2021. "Private vs. public communication: Difference of opinion and reputational concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 196(C).
    11. Name-Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2019. "Social pressure, transparency, and voting in committees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 184(C).
    12. Stephen Hansen & Michael McMahon & Andrea Prat, 2018. "Transparency and Deliberation Within the FOMC: A Computational Linguistics Approach," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 133(2), pages 801-870.
    13. Chappell, Henry W. & McGregor, Rob Roy, 2018. "Committee decision-making at Sweden's Riksbank," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 120-133.
    14. Alan S. Blinder, 2009. "Making Monetary Policy by Committee," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 171-194, August.
    15. Hansen, Stephen & McMahon, Michael, 2011. "How Experts Decide: Identifying Preferences versus Signals from Policy Decisions," Economic Research Papers 270761, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    16. Andrea Mattozzi & Marcos Y. Nakaguma, 2016. "Public versus Secret Voting in Committees," Working Papers, Department of Economics 2016_29, University of São Paulo (FEA-USP).
    17. Eijffinger, Sylvester & Mahieu, Ronald & Raes, Louis, 2018. "Inferring hawks and doves from voting records," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 107-120.
    18. Fehrler, Sebastian & Hughes, Niall, 2014. "How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation (And Why That May Be A Good Thing)," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100440, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    19. Francisco Ruge‐Murcia, 2022. "How do central banks make decisions?," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 55(4), pages 1643-1670, November.
    20. Ehrmann, Michael & Blinder, Alan & De Haan, Jakob & ,, 2022. "Central Bank Communication with the General Public: Promise or False Hope?," CEPR Discussion Papers 17441, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central bank communication; dissent; minutes; monetary policy committees; transparency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cnb:rpnrpn:2022/02. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Jan Babecky (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cnbgvcz.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.