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Nonseparable Preferences and Optimal Social Security Systems

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Author Info
Narayana Kocherlakota
Borys Grochulski

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 843644000000000156.

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Date of creation: 22 Jul 2007
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000156

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  1. Mark Huggett & Juan Carols Parra, . "How Well Does the US Social Insurance System Provide Social Insurance?," Working Papers gueconwpa~06-06-11, Georgetown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Mikhail Golosov & Narayana Kocherlakota & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2003. "Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(3), pages 569-587, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Stefania Albanesi & Christopher Sleet, 2006. "Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 73(1), pages 1-30, 01. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Mikhail Golosov & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2005. "Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000450, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Diamond, P. A. & Mirrlees, J. A., 1978. "A model of social insurance with variable retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 295-336, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Borys Grochulski & Tomasz Piskorski, 2007. "Risky human capital and deferred capital income taxation," Working Paper 06-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. [Downloadable!]
  7. Narayana R. Kocherlakota, 2005. "Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1587-1621, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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