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Bank Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Reint Gropp

    (Halle Institute for Economic Research)

  • Thomas C. Mosk

    (Goethe University Frankfurt)

  • Steven Ongena

    (University of Zurich and Swiss Finance Institute)

  • Carlo Wix

    (Goethe University Frankfurt)

Abstract

We study the impact of higher capital requirements on banks' balance sheets and its transmission to the real economy. The 2011 EBA capital exercise provides an almost ideal quasi-natural experiment, which allows us to identify the effect of higher capital requirements using a difference-in-differences matching estimator. We find that treated banks increase their capital ratios not by raising their levels of equity, but by reducing their credit supply. We also show that this reduction in credit supply results in lower firm-, investment-, and sales growth for firms which obtain a larger share of their bank credit from the treated banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Reint Gropp & Thomas C. Mosk & Steven Ongena & Carlo Wix, 2016. "Bank Response to Higher Capital Requirements: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 16-70, Swiss Finance Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:chf:rpseri:rp1670
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bank capital requirements; bank lending; real economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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