Capital Regulation and Bank Risk Taking: Completing Blum’s Picture
AbstractThis paper studies the intertemporal effects that capital regulation has on curbing bank risk taking, using the seminal model proposed in Blum (1999). Threshold values of the requirement in each period, for which capital regulation start affecting bank risk taking decisions, are calculated. One main lesson from this exercise is that constant capital requirements (as considered in Basel I) are indeed capable of reducing risk taking below the unregulated solution, and can even achieve the zero bankruptcy cost, socially efficient level of risk. However, that might happen for very high levels of the requirement, and at the cost of reducing financial intermediation. A second important lesson is that as the dynamic of risk depends on these thresholds, and they in turn depend upon the initial equity of the bank; knowing the latter is essential for the regulator to determine the effectiveness of capital regulation. Additional market instruments and effective monitoring and supervision (as proposed in Basel II) could be helpful on this task.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Central Bank of Chile in its series Working Papers Central Bank of Chile with number 416.
Date of creation: Mar 2007
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