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Bank capital regulation with random audits

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Author Info

  • Bhattacharya, Sudipto
  • Plank, Manfred
  • Strobl, Gunter
  • Zechner, Josef

Abstract

We consider a model of optimal bank closure rules (cum capital replenishment by banks), with Poisson-distributed audits of the banks asset value by the regulator, with the goal of eliminating (ameliorating) the incentives of levered bank shareholder/mangers to take excessive risks in their choice of underlying assets. The roles of (tax or other) subsidies on deposit interest payments by the ban, and of the auditing frequency are examined

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.

Volume (Year): 26 (2002)
Issue (Month): 7-8 (July)
Pages: 1301-1321

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Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:26:y:2002:i:7-8:p:1301-1321

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References

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  1. Fries, Steven & Mella-Barral, Pierre & Perraudin, William, 1997. "Optimal bank reorganization and the fair pricing of deposit guarantees," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 441-468, April.
  2. Merton, Robert C., 1973. "On the pricing of corporate debt: the risk structure of interest rates," Working papers 684-73., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  3. Bhattacharya, Sudipto, 1982. " Aspects of Monetary and Banking Theory and Moral Hazard," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(2), pages 371-84, May.
  4. Bhattacharya Sudipto & Thakor Anjan V., 1993. "Contemporary Banking Theory," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 2-50, October.
  5. Merton, Robert C, 1978. "On the Cost of Deposit Insurance When There Are Surveillance Costs," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 51(3), pages 439-52, July.
  6. Fischer, Edwin O & Heinkel, Robert & Zechner, Josef, 1989. " Dynamic Capital Structure Choice: Theory and Tests," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 44(1), pages 19-40, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Samu Peura & Esa Jokivuolle, 2004. "Simulation-based stress testing of banks’ regulatory capital adequacy," Finance 0405003, EconWPA.
  2. Christian A. Johnson, 2005. "Modelos de alerta temprana para pronosticar crisis bancarias: desde la extracción de señales a las redes neuronales," Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, Ilades-Georgetown University, Economics Department, vol. 20(1), pages 95-121, June.
  3. Pagès, H. & Santos, J., 2002. "Optimal Supervisory Policies and Depositor-Preferences Laws," Working papers 91, Banque de France.
  4. Decamps, Jean-Paul & Rochet, Jean-Charles & Roger, Benoit, 2004. "The three pillars of Basel II: optimizing the mix," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 132-155, April.
  5. Jijun Niu, 2008. "Bank Competition, Risk, and Subordinated Debt," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 37-56, February.
  6. Abel Elizalde, 2007. "From Basel I To Basel Ii: An Analysis Of The Three Pillars," Working Papers wp2007_0704, CEMFI.
  7. Mohamed Belhaj & Nataliya Klimenko, 2012. "Optimal Preventive Bank Supervision Combining Random Audits and Continuous Intervention," AMSE Working Papers 1201, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France.
  8. Iulia Iuga, 2011. "Comparative Study On The Evolution Of Loans Anddeposits Between The Romanian Bank For Development (Brd) - Groupe Societe Generale And The Romanian Banking System," Annales Universitatis Apulensis Series Oeconomica, Faculty of Sciences, "1 Decembrie 1918" University, Alba Iulia, vol. 2(13), pages 27.
  9. Episcopos, Athanasios, 2008. "Bank capital regulation in a barrier option framework," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(8), pages 1677-1686, August.
  10. Peura, Samu & Jokivuolle, Esa, 2003. "Simulation-based stress testing of banks’ regulatory capital adequacy," Research Discussion Papers 4/2003, Bank of Finland.
  11. Koziol, Christian & Lawrenz, Jochen, 2009. "What makes a bank risky? Insights from the optimal capital structure of banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 861-873, May.
  12. Delis, Manthos D & Staikouras, Panagiotis, 2009. "On-site audits, sanctions, and bank risk-taking: An empirical overture towards a novel regulatory and supervisory philosophy," MPRA Paper 16836, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Nataliya Klimenko, 2013. "Tailoring Bank Capital Regulation for Tail Risk," Working Papers halshs-00796490, HAL.
  14. Rochet, Jean-Charles & Villeneuve, Stéphane, 2011. "Liquidity management and corporate demand for hedging and insurance," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 303-323, July.
  15. Jean-Charles Rochet, 2004. "Rebalancing the three pillars of Basel II," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Sep, pages 7-21.
  16. Nancy Silva, 2007. "Capital Regulation and Bank Risk Taking: Completing Blum’s Picture," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 416, Central Bank of Chile.
  17. Hankir, Yassin & Rauch, Christian & Umber, Marc P., 2011. "Bank M&A: A market power story?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(9), pages 2341-2354, September.
  18. Keppo, Jussi & Kofman, Leonard & Meng, Xu, 2010. "Unintended consequences of the market risk requirement in banking regulation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 2192-2214, October.
  19. Xavier Freixas & Bruno Maria Parigi, 2007. "Banking Regulation and Prompt Corrective Action," CESifo Working Paper Series 2136, CESifo Group Munich.
  20. Nataliya Klimenko, 2013. "Tailoring Bank Capital Regulation for Tail Risk," AMSE Working Papers 1310, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, Marseille, France, revised Feb 2013.
  21. E. Agliardi, 2007. "Bank Closure Policies and Capital Requirements: a Note," Working Papers 603, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

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