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Performance-Based Incentives for Health: Six Years of Results from Supply-Side Programs in Haiti

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  • Rena Eichler
  • Paul Auxila
  • Uder Antoine
  • Bernateau Desmangles
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    Abstract

    USAID launched a project in 1995 to deliver basic health services in Haiti. The project began by reimbursing contracted NGOs for documented expenditures or inputs. In 1999, payment was changed to being based partly on attaining performance targets or outputs. The project also provided technical assistance to the NGOs, along with opportunities to participate in an NGO network and other cross-fertilization activities. Remarkable improvements in key health indicators have been achieved in the six years since payment for performance was phased in. Although it is difficult to isolate the effects of performance-based payment on these improved indicators from the efforts aimed at strengthening NGOs and other factors, panel regression results suggest that the new payment incentives were responsible for considerable improvements in both immunization coverage and attended deliveries. Results for prenatal and postnatal care were less significant, perhaps suggesting a strong patient behavioral element that is not under the influence of provider actions.

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    File URL: http://www.cgdev.org/files/13543_file_Haiti_Incentives.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Center for Global Development in its series Working Papers with number 121.

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    Length: 34 pages
    Date of creation: Apr 2007
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:cgd:wpaper:121

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    Web page: http://www.cgdev.org

    Related research

    Keywords: Health; Haiti;

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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    1. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January.
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