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Reallocation of Corporate Resources and Managerial Incentives in Internal Capital Markets

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  • Sandro Brusco
  • Fausto Panunzi

Abstract

Diversified firms often trade at a discount with respect to their focused counterparts. The literature has tried to explain the apparent misallocation of resources with lobbying activities or power struggles. We show that diversification can destroy value even when resources are efficiently allocated ex post. When managers derive utility from the funds under their purview, moving funds across divisions may diminish their incentives. The ex ante reduction in managerial incentives can more than offset the increase in firm value due to the ex post efficient reallocation of funds. This effect is robust to the introduction of monetary incentives. We apply our model to the analysis of the optimal reallocation policy and to the effect of the asymmetry among divisions. In general it is optimal for headquarters to commit not to reallocate at least a fraction of funds. As a result, the investment in a given division is more sensitive to the division’s cash flow than to other divisions‘ cash flow. Asymmetries in size and growth prospects increase the diversification discount.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 735.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_735

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  15. Toni M. Whited, 2001. "Is It Inefficient Investment that Causes the Diversification Discount?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 56(5), pages 1667-1691, October.
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  19. Rajan, Raghuram G & Servaes, Henri & Zingales, Luigi, 1998. "The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1801, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  20. Berger, Philip G. & Ofek, Eli, 1995. "Diversification's effect on firm value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 39-65, January.
  21. Jeremy C. Stein, 2000. "Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralized vs. Hierarchical Firms," NBER Working Papers 7705, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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