Optimal Pricing and Endogenous Herding
AbstractWe consider a monopolist who sells identical objects of common but unknown value in a herding-prone environment. Buyers make their purchasing decisions sequentially, and rely on a private signal as well as We consider a monopolist who sells identical objects of common but previous buyers’ actions to infer the common value of the object. The model applies to a variety of cases, such as the introduction of a new product or the sale of licenses to use a patent. We characterize the monopolist’s optimal pricing strategy and its implications for the temporal pattern of prices and for herding. The analysis is performed under alternative assumptions about observability of prices. We find that when previous prices are observable, herding may but need not arise. In contrast, herding arises immediately when previous prices are unobservable and the seller’s equilibrium strategy is a pure Markov strategy. While the possibility of social learning is present in the first case, it is absent in the second. Finally, we examine the seller’s incentive to manipulate the buyers’ evaluation of the object when buyers are naive. Using secret discounts the seller successfully interferes with social learning, and herding occurs in finite time.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 727.
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
herding; informational cascades; optimal pricing;
Other versions of this item:
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
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Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
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- Bose, Subir & Orosel, Gerhard O & Ottaviani, Marco & Vesterlund, Lise, 2005. "Dynamic Monopoly Pricing and Herding," CEPR Discussion Papers 5003, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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