In this paper we investigate the incentives of unemployed workers to wait for a recall when recall probabilities are endogenously determined by the waiting decisions of others. Because of a positive externality that arises when workers seek new employment, an excessive number of workers choose to wait for a recall, and structural adjustment is slow. We also find that a small reduction in the unemployment benefits, or introducing a small cash bonus for workers that get a new job, may have no e.ect on unemployment in some cases, while eradicating significant levels of unemployment in other cases. Our analysis suggests that the government may face a Samaritan's Dilemma if it can influence the recall probability of workers, and that multiple equilibria may exist in a game involving both workers and an unemployment-averse government. Furthermore, we explore a link to the war of attrition literature, showing that the Bulow and Klemperer (1999) "one too many"-result may not hold if there is uncertainty concerning when the game ends.
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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number
CESifo Working Paper No. 708.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search R23 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population
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