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Job search and unemployment insurance: New evidence from time use data

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  • Krueger, Alan B.
  • Mueller, Andreas

Abstract

This paper provides new evidence on job search intensity of the unemployed in the U.S., modeling job search intensity as time allocated to job search activities. The major findings are: 1) the average U.S. unemployed worker devotes about 41Â min to job search on weekdays, which is substantially more than their European counterparts; 2) workers who expect to be recalled by their previous employer search substantially less than the average unemployed worker; 3) across the 50 states and D.C., job search is inversely related to the generosity of unemployment benefits, with an elasticity between -1.6 and -2.2; 4) job search intensity for those eligible for Unemployment Insurance (UI) increases prior to benefit exhaustion; and 5) time devoted to job search is fairly constant regardless of unemployment duration for those who are ineligible for UI.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 94 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (April)
Pages: 298-307

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:94:y:2010:i:3-4:p:298-307

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

Related research

Keywords: Unemployment Unemployment insurance Job search Time use Unemployment benefits Inequality;

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References

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  24. Jones, Stephen R G, 1988. "The Relationship between Unemployment Spells and Reservation Wages as a Test of Search Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(4), pages 741-65, November.
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  1. What are unemployeds doing with their time?
    by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2008-09-15 08:37:00
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