Optimal Compulsion when Behavioral Biases Vary and the State Errs
AbstractWhen behavioral biases have varying sizes, and the State seeks to correct behavior through compulsion, the question is how to design optimal compulsion. One argument is that the amount of compulsion should rise with the size of the bias to be “cured”. A contrary argument is that since compulsion affects actions, and recommended actions are independent from the bias, the amount of compulsion should not depend on the bias. This puzzle is solved for the case where individuals are affected by a bias that leads them to under-save, acknowledging that the planner predicts each individual’s optimal action with error. Since only low-bias individuals are able to correct the planner’s mistakes when mandated to save too little, but not in the opposite direction due to a costly spread, the optimal amount of compulsion rises with the predicted bias. As an application, the paper explores a behavioral rationale for a Maximum for Taxable Earnings (MTE). It finds that if (1) the State’s information is limited to current earnings; (2) earnings do not influence the earnings ratio for old age; and (3) the bias is smaller only for the highest earnings quintile, then a MTE near the 80th percentile of the earnings distribution is optimal.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 3316.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
behavioral bias; compulsion; optimal policy; time-inconsistency; overoptimism; pensions; maximum taxable earnings;
Other versions of this item:
- Ursula Schwarzhaupt & Salvador Valdés-Prieto, 2010. "Optimal Compulsion when Behavioral Biases vary and the State Errs," Documentos de Trabajo 389, Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile..
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
- H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Homburg, Stefan, 2000. "Compulsory savings in the welfare state," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 233-239, August.
- Andras Simonovits, 2012. "Optimal Cap on Pension Contributions," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1208, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Julio Saavedra).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.