Prodigality and myopia. Two rationales for social security
AbstractAmong the rationales for social security, there is the fact that some people have to be forced to save. To explain undersaving, rational prodigality and hyperbolic preferences are often cited but treated separably. In this paper we study those two particular behaviors that lead to forced saving within an optimal income tax second-best setting.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2006073.
Date of creation: 00 Sep 2006
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social security; myopia; dual-self model; prodigality;
Other versions of this item:
- Pierre Pestieau & Uri Possen, 2008. "Prodigality And Myopia-Two Rationales For Social Security," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 76(6), pages 629-652, December.
- PESTIEAU, Pierre & POSSEN, Uri, . "Prodigality and myopia – Two rationales for social security," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- PESTIEAU , Pierre & POSSEN , Uri, 2008. "Prodigality and myopia. Two rationales for social security," CORE Discussion Papers 2008011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- CREMER, Helmuth & DE DONDER, Philippe & MALDONADO, Dario & PESTIEAU, Pierre, . "Designing a linear pension scheme with forced savings and wage heterogeneity," CORE Discussion Papers RP -2040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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