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Asset Auctions, Information, and Liquidity

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  • Xavier Vives

Abstract

A model is presented of a uniform price auction where bidders compete in demand schedules; the model allows for common and private values in the absence of exogenous noise. It is shown how private information yields more market power than the levels seen with full information. Results obtained here are broadly consistent with evidence from asset auctions, may help explain the response of central banks to the crisis, and suggest potential improvements in the auction formats of asset auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Xavier Vives, 2010. "Asset Auctions, Information, and Liquidity," CESifo Working Paper Series 2906, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2906
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bindseil, Ulrich & Nyborg, Kjell G. & Strebulaev, Ilya A., 2002. "Bidding and performance in repo auctions: evidence from ECB open market operations," Working Paper Series 157, European Central Bank.
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    4. Juan Ayuso & Rafael Repullo, 2003. "A Model of the Open Market Operations of the European Central Bank," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(490), pages 883-902, October.
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    6. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
    7. Ewerhart, Christian & Cassola, Nuno & Valla, Natacha, 2010. "Declining valuations and equilibrium bidding in central bank refinancing operations," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 30-43, January.
    8. Bruno Biais & David Martimort & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2000. "Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(4), pages 799-838, July.
    9. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    10. Paul Klemperer, 2009. "A New Auction for Substitutes: Central-Bank Liquidity Auctions, “Toxic Asset” Auctions, and Variable Product-Mix Auctions," Economics Papers 2009-W06, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
    11. LiCalzi, Marco & Pavan, Alessandro, 2005. "Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 227-250, January.
    12. Matti Keloharju & Kjell G. Nyborg & Kristian Rydqvist, 2005. "Strategic Behavior and Underpricing in Uniform Price Auctions: Evidence from Finnish Treasury Auctions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(4), pages 1865-1902, August.
    13. Bhattacharya, Utpal & Spiegel, Matthew, 1991. "Insiders, Outsiders, and Market Breakdowns," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 4(2), pages 255-282.
    14. Jaime F. Zender & James J.D. Wang, 2002. "Auctioning divisible goods," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 19(4), pages 673-705.
    15. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton, 2008. "A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction," Papers of Peter Cramton 08tara, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 2008.
    16. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On The Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-Unit Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 895-900, July.
    17. Goswami, Gautam & Noe, Thomas H & Rebello, Michael J, 1996. "Collusion in Uniform-Price Auctions: Experimental Evidence and Implications for Treasury Auctions," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(3), pages 757-785.
    18. Tenorio, Rafael, 1997. "Some evidence on strategic quantity reduction in multiple unit auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 209-213, August.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Edward Anderson & Pär Holmberg, 2023. "Multi-unit auctions with uncertain supply and single-unit demand," Working Papers EPRG2310, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    2. Manzano, Carolina & Vives, Xavier, 2021. "Market power and welfare in asymmetric divisible good auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(3), July.
    3. Yang Hao, 2023. "Financial Market with Learning from Price under Knightian Uncertainty," Working Papers hal-03686748, HAL.
    4. Xavier Vives, 2014. "Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(12), pages 3547-3592.
    5. Xavier Vives, 2011. "Competition and Stability in Banking," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Roberto Chang & Diego Saravia (ed.),Monetary Policy under Financial Turbulence, edition 1, volume 16, chapter 12, pages 455-502, Central Bank of Chile.
    6. Ollikka, Kimmo & Tukiainen, Janne, 2013. "Central bank liquidity auction mechanism design and the interbank market," Research Discussion Papers 21/2013, Bank of Finland.
    7. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2013_021 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Ollikka, Kimmo & Tukiainen, Janne, 2013. "Central bank liquidity auction mechanism design and the interbank market," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 21/2013, Bank of Finland.
    9. Pycia, Marek & Woodward, Kyle, 2021. "Auctions of Homogeneous Goods: A Case for Pay-as-Bid," CEPR Discussion Papers 15656, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    adverse selection; market power; reverse auctions; bid shading;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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