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Some evidence on strategic quantity reduction in multiple unit auctions

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  • Tenorio, Rafael

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  • Tenorio, Rafael, 1997. "Some evidence on strategic quantity reduction in multiple unit auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 209-213, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:55:y:1997:i:2:p:209-213
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, 1996. "Analyzing the Airwaves Auction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 159-175, Winter.
    2. Tenorio, Rafael, 1993. "Revenue Equivalence and Bidding Behavior in a Multi-unit Auction Market: An Empirical Analysis," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 75(2), pages 302-314, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. LiCalzi, Marco & Pavan, Alessandro, 2005. "Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 227-250, January.
    2. Xavier Vives, 2010. "Asset Auctions, Information, and Liquidity," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 467-477, 04-05.
    3. Rafael Romeu & Lawrence Ausubel, 2005. "Bidder Participation and Information in Currency Auctions," IMF Working Papers 2005/157, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Raphaële Préget, 2004. "Adjudications des valeurs du Trésor," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 18(4), pages 63-110.

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