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How "Chicagoan" are Gary Becker's Economic Models of Marriage?

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  • Shoshana Grossbard

Abstract

This paper describes Gary Becker’s theoretical models of marriage. At the micro-level, these are all rational choice models. At the market level, Becker offers two major types of models: partial equilibrium models based on Price Theory as taught by Marshall and Friedman and optimal sorting models based on optimal assignment models. The paper examines some of the possible intellectual influences on Becker’s theory of marriage, compares Becker’s research on marriage with that of some scholars interested in intra-marriage distribution, and documents that Becker’s students at Chicago were more interested in Becker’s Friedmanian models of marriage than in his optimal assignment models.

Suggested Citation

  • Shoshana Grossbard, 2009. "How "Chicagoan" are Gary Becker's Economic Models of Marriage?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2637, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2637
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    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp2637.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Funke & Marc Gronwald, 2009. "A Convex Hull Approach to Counterfactual Analysis of Trade Openness and Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series 2692, CESifo.
    2. Grossbard, Shoshana, 2010. "Independent Individual Decision-Makers in Household Models and the New Home Economics," IZA Discussion Papers 5138, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Grossbard, Shoshana & Gimenez-Nadal, José Ignacio & Molina, José Alberto, 2010. "Racial Discrimination and Household Chores," IZA Discussion Papers 5345, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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