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Game Theoretical Models of Market Structure

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  • John Sutton
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    Abstract

    This paper reviews the recent literature on game-theoretic models of market structure and their empirical implementation.

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    File URL: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/ei/ei15.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE in its series STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers with number 15.

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    Date of creation: Oct 1996
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    Handle: RePEc:cep:stieip:15

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    Web page: http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/default.asp

    Related research

    Keywords: Game-theoretic modesl; market structure; industrial organization; framework; rationalise; equilibrium outcomes; theory.;

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    1. Peltzman, Sam, 1991. "The Handbook of Industrial Organization: Review Article," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 201-17, February.
    2. Cabral, L. & Riordan, M., 1992. "The Learning Curve, Market Dominance and Predatory Pricing," Papers, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme 39, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
    3. Vickers, John S, 1986. "The Evolution of Market Structure When There Is a Sequence of Innovations," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 1-12, September.
    4. Franklin M. Fisher, 1989. "Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 113-124, Spring.
    5. Dixit, Avinash K & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1975. "Monopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 64, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    6. Timothy F. Bresnahan & Peter C. Reiss, 1987. "Do Entry Conditions Vary across Markets?," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 18(3), pages 833-882.
    7. Glenn Ellison, 1994. "Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 37-57, Spring.
    8. Gruber, Harald, 1992. "Persistence of Leadership in Product Innovation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(4), pages 359-75, December.
    9. Irwin, Douglas A & Klenow, Peter J, 1994. "Learning-by-Doing Spillovers in the Semiconductor Industry," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1200-1227, December.
    10. Harald Gruber, 1995. "Market Structure, Learning and Product Innovation: Evidence for the EPROM Market," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(1), pages 87-101.
    11. Budd, Christopher & Harris, Christopher & Vickers, John, 1993. "A Model of the Evolution of Duopoly: Does the Asymmetry between Firms Tend to Increase or Decrease?," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 543-73, July.
    12. Mark J. Roberts & Larry Samuelson, 1988. "An Empirical Analysis of Dynamic, Nonprice Competition in an Oligopolistic Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 200-220, Summer.
    13. Beath, John & Katsoulacos, Yannis & Ulph, David, 1987. "Sequential Product Innovation and Industry Evolution," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 97(388a), pages 32-43, Supplemen.
    14. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1987. "Product Differentiation and Industrial Structure," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 131-46, December.
    15. Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H, 1988. "An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 865-83, December.
    16. Margaret Levenstein, 1993. "Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion: A Study of the Pre-World War I Bromine Industry," NBER Historical Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 0050, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Bresnahan, Timothy F. & Reiss, Peter C., 1991. "Empirical models of discrete games," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(1-2), pages 57-81.
    18. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1980. "A Model in Which an Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a Higher Price," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1575-79, September.
    19. Berry, Steven T, 1992. "Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 60(4), pages 889-917, July.
    20. John Sutton, 1996. "Gibrats Legacy," STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE 14, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    21. Gasmi, F. & Laffont, J. J. & Vuong, Q. H., 1990. "A structural approach to empirical analysis of collusive behavior," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(2-3), pages 513-523, May.
    22. A. M. Spence, 1981. "The Learning Curve and Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 49-70, Spring.
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