Firm Size and Judicial Efficiency in Italy: Evidence from the Neighbour's Tribunal
AbstractWe investigate the causal relationship between judicial efficiency and firm size across Italian municipalities, exploiting spatial discontinuities in tribunals' jurisdiction for identification. Results show that halving the length of civil proceedings, average firm size would increase by around 8-12%, everything else equal. Results are robust to a number of different specifications, based on two different databases.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Spatial Economics Research Centre, LSE in its series SERC Discussion Papers with number 0108.
Date of creation: May 2012
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Web page: http://www.spatialeconomics.ac.uk/SERC/publications/default.asp
Justice efficiency; Firm size; Spatial discontinuity approach; Italy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- O18 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Urban, Rural, Regional, and Transportation Analysis; Housing; Infrastructure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-05-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2012-05-15 (Business Economics)
- NEP-EFF-2012-05-15 (Efficiency & Productivity)
- NEP-LAW-2012-05-15 (Law & Economics)
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