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Independência e autonomia do Banco Central: mais sobre o debate [Central Bank independence and autonomy: more on this debate]

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Author Info

  • Marco Crocco

    ()

  • Frederico G. Jayme Jr.

    ()

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze critically the Independence of Central Banks (ICB). By presenting the theoretical arguments that support the independence, as well as some empirical studies regarding this topic, we introduce the main critical concerns about the argument of ICB. Besides, we set the most striking aspects of the effectiveness of the Independence of Central Banks as a "panacea" for solving the inflationary pressures in developing countries. Conclusions highlight the limits of ICB in countries with high external constraints such as Brazil.

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File URL: http://www.cedeplar.ufmg.br/pesquisas/td/TD%20199.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Cedeplar, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais in its series Textos para Discussão Cedeplar-UFMG with number td199.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: May 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cdp:texdis:td199

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Related research

Keywords: central bank; central bank independence; Brazil;

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References

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  1. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
  2. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  3. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
  4. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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