A Continuous Dilemma âˆ—
AbstractWe study prisonerâ€™s dilemmas played in continuous time with ï¬‚ow payoï¬€s over 60 seconds. In most cases, the median rate of mutual cooperation rises to 90% or more. Control sessions with 8-time repeated matchings achieve less than half as much cooperation, and cooperation rates approach zero in one-shot control sessions. In follow-up sessions with a variable number of subperiods, cooperation rates increase nearly linearly as the grid size decreases and, with one-second subperiods, they approach the level seen in continuous sessions. Our data support a strand of theory that explains how the capacity to respond rapidly stabilizes cooperation and destabilizes defection in the prisonerâ€™s dilemma.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz in its series Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number qt3475m3dq.
Date of creation: 10 Sep 2009
Date of revision:
Prisonerâ€™s dilemma; game theory; laboratory experiment; continuous time game.;
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