Johannes Becker () (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law) Clemens Fuest () (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation)
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This note provides a novel argument why countries may have incentives to allow for some profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. The reason is that a tightening of transfer pricing policies by high tax countries leads to more agressive tax rate competition by low tax countries.
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Paper provided by Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation in its series Working Papers with number
0930.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
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