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Transfer Pricing Policy and the Intensity of Tax Rate Competition

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  • Johannes Becker

    ()
    (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law)

  • Clemens Fuest

    ()
    (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation)

Abstract

This note provides a novel argument why countries may have incentives to allow for some profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. The reason is that a tightening of transfer pricing policies by high tax countries leads to more agressive tax rate competition by low tax countries.

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File URL: http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Working_Papers/Series_09/WP0930.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation in its series Working Papers with number 0930.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:btx:wpaper:0930

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Keywords: Corporate Taxation; Profit Shifting; Tax Competition;

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  1. Peralta, Susana & Wauthy, Xavier & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2006. "Should countries control international profit shifting?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 24-37, January.
  2. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 109-111, February.
  3. Qing Hong & Michael Smart, 2006. "In praise of tax havens: International tax planning and foreign direct investment," Working Papers tecipa-265, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  4. Bucovetsky, Sam & Haufler, Andreas, 2008. "Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?," Munich Reprints in Economics 19975, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  5. Bucovetsky, Sam & Haufler, Andreas, 2005. "Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?," Discussion Papers in Economics 729, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  6. Haupt, Alexander & Peters, Wolfgang, 2005. "Restricting preferential tax regimes to avoid harmful tax competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 493-507, September.
  7. Harry Grubert & Joel Slemrod, 1998. "The Effect Of Taxes On Investment And Income Shifting To Puerto Rico," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(3), pages 365-373, August.
  8. Slemrod, Joel & Wilson, John D., 2009. "Tax competition with parasitic tax havens," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1261-1270, December.
  9. Keen, Michael, 2001. "Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 54(n. 4), pages 757-62, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Ronald B. Davies, 2010. "The Silver Lining of Red Tape," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp328, IIIS.
  2. Thiess Buettner & Michael Overesch & Georg Wamser, 2014. "Anti Profit-Shifting Rules and Foreign Direct Investment," CESifo Working Paper Series 4710, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Sheehan Rahman & Jashim Uddin Ahmed, 2012. "An Evaluation of the Changing Role of Management Accountants in Recent Years," Indus Journal of Management & Social Science (IJMSS), Department of Business Administration, vol. 6(1), pages 18-30, January.
  4. Johannes Becker, 2010. "Strategic Trade Policy through the Tax System," CESifo Working Paper Series 3066, CESifo Group Munich.

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