This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Transfer Pricing Policy and the Intensity of Tax Rate Competition

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Johannes Becker () (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law)
Clemens Fuest () (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This note provides a novel argument why countries may have incentives to allow for some profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. The reason is that a tightening of transfer pricing policies by high tax countries leads to more agressive tax rate competition by low tax countries.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://users.ox.ac.uk/~mast1732/RePEc/pdf/WP0930.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation in its series Working Papers with number 0930.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:btx:wpaper:0930

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Park End Street, Oxford OX1 1HP UK
Phone: +44 (0)1865 288800
Fax: +44 (0)1865 288805
Web page: http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/tax/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Simon Loretz).

Related research
Keywords: Corporate Taxation; Profit Shifting; Tax Competition;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bucovetsky, Sam & Haufler, Andreas, 2008. "Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 188-201, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Peralta, Susana & Wauthy, Xavier & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2006. "Should countries control international profit shifting?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 24-37, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Haupt, Alexander & Peters, Wolfgang, 2005. "Restricting preferential tax regimes to avoid harmful tax competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 493-507, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 109-111, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over 1000 institutions contribute their bibliographic data directly to this service.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-18.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.