Transfer Pricing Policy and the Intensity of Tax Rate Competition
AbstractThis note provides a novel argument why countries may have incentives to allow for some profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. The reason is that a tightening of transfer pricing policies by high tax countries leads to more agressive tax rate competition by low tax countries.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation in its series Working Papers with number 0930.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Park End Street, Oxford OX1 1HP UK
Phone: +44 (0)1865 288800
Fax: +44 (0)1865 288805
Web page: http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/ideas-impact/tax/
More information through EDIRC
Corporate Taxation; Profit Shifting; Tax Competition;
Other versions of this item:
- Becker, Johannes & Fuest, Clemens, 2012. "Transfer pricing policy and the intensity of tax rate competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 146-148.
- H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
- F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ACC-2009-11-07 (Accounting & Auditing)
- NEP-ALL-2009-11-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-MIC-2009-11-07 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2009-11-07 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PUB-2009-11-07 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Slemrod, Joel & Wilson, John D., 2009.
"Tax competition with parasitic tax havens,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1261-1270, December.
- PERALTA, Susana & WAUTHY , Xavier & van YPERSELE, Tanguy, 2003.
"Should countries control international profit shifting ?,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2003072, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Peralta, Susana & Wauthy, Xavier & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2006. "Should countries control international profit shifting?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 24-37, January.
- PERALTA, Susana & WAUTHY, Xavier & VAN YPERSELE, Tanguy, . "Should countries control international profit shifting?," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1795, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Haupt, Alexander & Peters, Wolfgang, 2005. "Restricting preferential tax regimes to avoid harmful tax competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 493-507, September.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2009.
"Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition,"
Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 109-111, February.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2008. "Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-10, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Harry Grubert & Joel Slemrod, 1994.
"The Effect of Taxes on Investment and Income Shifting to Puerto Rico,"
NBER Working Papers
4869, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Harry Grubert & Joel Slemrod, 1998. "The Effect Of Taxes On Investment And Income Shifting To Puerto Rico," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(3), pages 365-373, August.
- Bucovetsky, Sam & Haufler, Andreas, 2008.
"Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed,"
Journal of International Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 188-201, January.
- Sam Bucovetsky & Andreas Haufler, 2005. "Tax Competition when Firms Choose their Organizational Form: Should Tax Loopholes for Multinationals be Closed?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1625, CESifo Group Munich.
- Bucovetsky, Sam & Haufler, Andreas, 2005. "Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?," Discussion Papers in Economics 729, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Qing Hong & Michael Smart, 2006.
"In praise of tax havens: International tax planning and foreign direct investment,"
tecipa-265, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Hong, Qing & Smart, Michael, 2010. "In praise of tax havens: International tax planning and foreign direct investment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 82-95, January.
- Qing Hong & Michael Smart, 2007. "In Praise of Tax Havens: International Tax Planning and Foreign Direct Investment," CESifo Working Paper Series 1942, CESifo Group Munich.
- Keen, Michael, 2001. "Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 54(n. 4), pages 757-62, December .
- Johannes Becker, 2010. "Strategic Trade Policy through the Tax System," CESifo Working Paper Series 3066, CESifo Group Munich.
- Davies, Ronald B., 2013.
"The silver lining of red tape,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 68-76.
- Ronald B. Davies, 2009. "The Silver Lining of Red Tape," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp328, IIIS.
- Ronald B Davies, 2010. "The Silver Lining of Red Tape," Working Papers 201018, School Of Economics, University College Dublin.
- Sheehan Rahman & Jashim Uddin Ahmed, 2012. "An Evaluation of the Changing Role of Management Accountants in Recent Years," Indus Journal of Management & Social Science (IJMSS), Department of Business Administration, vol. 6(1), pages 18-30, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Li Liu).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.