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Transfer Pricing Policy and the Intensity of Tax Rate Competition

Author

Listed:
  • Johannes Becker

    (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law)

  • Clemens Fuest

    (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation)

Abstract

This note provides a novel argument why countries may have incentives to allow for some profit shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. The reason is that a tightening of transfer pricing policies by high tax countries leads to more agressive tax rate competition by low tax countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Johannes Becker & Clemens Fuest, 2009. "Transfer Pricing Policy and the Intensity of Tax Rate Competition," Working Papers 0930, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
    • Handle: RePEc:btx:wpaper:0930
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peralta, Susana & Wauthy, Xavier & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2006. "Should countries control international profit shifting?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 24-37, January.
    2. Bucovetsky, Sam & Haufler, Andreas, 2008. "Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 188-201, January.
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    7. Slemrod, Joel & Wilson, John D., 2009. "Tax competition with parasitic tax havens," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1261-1270, December.
    8. Hong, Qing & Smart, Michael, 2010. "In praise of tax havens: International tax planning and foreign direct investment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 82-95, January.
    9. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 109-111, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Thiess Buettner & Michael Overesch & Georg Wamser, 2018. "Anti profit-shifting rules and foreign direct investment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(3), pages 553-580, June.
    2. Johannes Becker & Ronald B. Davies, 2015. "Negotiated Transfer Prices," Working Papers 201527, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    3. Sheehan Rahman & Jashim Uddin Ahmed, 2012. "An Evaluation of the Changing Role of Management Accountants in Recent Years," Indus Journal of Management & Social Science (IJMSS), Department of Business Administration, vol. 6(1), pages 18-30, January.
    4. Sijbren Cnossen, 2018. "Corporation taxes in the European Union: Slowly moving toward comprehensive business income taxation?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(3), pages 808-840, June.
    5. Joana Andrade Vicente, 2023. "Rethinking corporate taxation in the European Union: how and where to tax Multinational Enterprises," Working Papers REM 2023/0286, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, REM, Universidade de Lisboa.
    6. Mongrain, Steeve & Oh, David & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2023. "Tax competition in the presence of profit shifting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 224(C).
    7. von Hagen, Dominik & Pönnighaus, Fabian Nicolas, 2017. "International taxation and M&A prices," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-040, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    8. Devereux, Michael P. & Fuest, Clemens & Lockwood, Ben, 2015. "The taxation of foreign profits: A unified view," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 83-97.
    9. Finke, Katharina & Fuest, Clemens & Nusser, Hannah & Spengel, Christoph, 2014. "Extending taxation of interest and royalty income at source: An option to limit base erosion and profit shifting?," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-073, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    10. Athiphat Muthitacharoen, 2023. "Location Choice And Tax Responsiveness Of Foreign Multinationals: Evidence From Asean Countries," The Singapore Economic Review (SER), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 68(01), pages 217-242, March.
    11. Davies, Ronald B., 2013. "The silver lining of red tape," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 68-76.
    12. Corti Paul Lakuma & Rehema Kahunde, 2023. "Global minimum corporate income tax: Challenges and prospects for Uganda," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2023-137, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    13. Clemens Fuest & Samina Sultan, 2019. "How Will Brexit Affect Tax Competition and Tax Harmonization? The Role of Discriminatory Taxation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 72(1), pages 111-138, March.
    14. Mr. Alexander D Klemm & Ms. Li Liu, 2019. "The Impact of Profit Shifting on Economic Activity and Tax Competition," IMF Working Papers 2019/287, International Monetary Fund.
    15. Choi, Jay Pil & Furusawa, Taiji & Ishikawa, Jota, 2020. "Transfer pricing regulation and tax competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    16. Zarko Y. Kalamov, 2023. "Internal debt and welfare," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 25(1), pages 196-224, February.
    17. Johannes Becker, 2014. "Strategic Trade Policy through the Tax System," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(9), pages 1237-1246, September.
    18. Giulia Zilio, 2017. "Cross-Country Differences in Corporate Tax Rates, Anti-Tax Avoidance Rules, and Base Erosion Profit Shifting," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper1701, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    19. Morgan, Stephen & Farris, Jarrad & Johnson, Michael E., 2022. "Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Recent Trends Leading up to the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA)," USDA Miscellaneous 329077, United States Department of Agriculture.
    20. Arie Pratama, 2020. "Corporate governance, foreign operations and transfer pricing practice: the case of Indonesian manufacturing companies," International Journal of Business and Globalisation, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 24(2), pages 185-200.
    21. Johannes Becker & Michael Kriebel, 2017. "Fiscal equalisation schemes under competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(5), pages 800-816, September.
    22. Ruud Mooij & Li Liu, 2020. "At a Cost: The Real Effects of Transfer Pricing Regulations," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 68(1), pages 268-306, March.
    23. Joana Andrade Vicente, 2021. "Tax us, if you can: a game theoretic approach to profit shifting within the European Union," Working Papers REM 2021/0206, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, REM, Universidade de Lisboa.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate Taxation; Profit Shifting; Tax Competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H25 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Business Taxes and Subsidies
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business

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