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Provider Payment Methods and Incentives

Author

Listed:
  • Randall P. Ellis

    (Boston University)

  • Bruno Martins

    (Boston University)

  • Michelle McKinnon Miller

    (Loyola Marymount University)

Abstract

Diverse provider payment systems create incentives that affect the quantity and quality of health care services provided. Payments can be based on provider characteristics, which tend to minimize incentives for quality and quantity. Or payments can be based on quantities of services provided and patient characteristics, which provide stronger incentives for quality and quantity. Payments methods using both broader bundles of services and larger numbers of payment categories are growing in prevalence. The recent innovation of performance-based payment attempts to target payments on key patient attributes so as to improve incentives, better manage patients, and control costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Randall P. Ellis & Bruno Martins & Michelle McKinnon Miller, 2015. "Provider Payment Methods and Incentives," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series wp2015-023, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2015-023
    as

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    File URL: http://blogs.bu.edu/ellisrp/files/2015/11/EllisMartinsMiller-Encyclopedia-of-Public-Health-20150812_withbios.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Waitzberg, Ruth & Gerkens, Sophie & Dimova, Antoniya & Bryndová, Lucie & Vrangbæk, Karsten & Jervelund, Signe Smith & Birk, Hans Okkels & Rajan, Selina & Habicht, Triin & Tynkkynen, Liina-Kaisa & Kesk, 2022. "Balancing financial incentives during COVID-19: A comparison of provider payment adjustments across 20 countries," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 126(5), pages 398-407.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Provider payment; fees schedules; Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG); moral hazard; selection; capitation; incentives; risk adjustment;
    All these keywords.

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