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Mis-match, Re-match, and Investment

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Author Info
Thomas Gall (Boston University and University of Bonn)
Patrick Legros (ECARES, Universit´e Libre de Bruxelles and CEPR)
Andrew F. Newman (Boston University and CEPR)

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Abstract

Mobility depends essentially on investment, which often occurs in environments in which individuals match (school) or will match after investing (the labor market). Where partners can transfer surplus to each other only imperfectly (NTU), the pattern of matching will typically be inefficient, involving too much segregation, and providing a possible rationale for ”associational redistribution” such as affirmative action: a social planner who could enforce a matching outcome that differs from the market outcome may raise aggregate social surplus. We show that this static inefficiency due to NTU can be exacerbated in a dynamic environment in which individuals’ productive types are determined by investments made before they match. In contrast to TU models there will typically be investment distortions, with high types over-investing and low types under-investing. We study several forms of associational redistribution, assessing the differential effects of achievement-based and background-based polices; early-stage and later-stage policies; and interactions between them.

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File URL: http://www.bu.edu/econ/ied/dp/papers/dp%20189.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Boston University - Department of Economics in its series Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series with number dp-189.

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Length: 47
Date of creation: May 2009
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Handle: RePEc:bos:iedwpr:dp-189

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Related research
Keywords: Matching; nontransferable utility; affirmative action; segregation; education;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
J78 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Public Policy (including comparable worth)

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.


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