Tax Administration Reform and Taxpayer Compliance in India
AbstractThis paper evaluates effects on tax compliance of simple reforms in personnel policy in the Indian income tax administration. Taxpayers voluntarily disclosing higher incomes are currently assigned to special assessment units. To avoid this, high income taxpayers have an added incentive to understate their incomes. Empirical evidence consistent with this hypothesis is found. It explains spillover effects of enforcement efforts across assessment units. We incorporate these spillovers in estimating revenue effects of increased support staff. The results imply significant compliance gains would accrue from expanded staff employment and changes in assignment procedures for staff and taxpayers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Boston University - Department of Economics in its series Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series with number dp-137.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2003
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Arindam Das-Gupta & Shanto Ghosh & Dilip Mookherjee, 2004. "Tax Administration Reform and Taxpayer Compliance in India," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 11(5), pages 575-600, 09.
- NEP-ALL-2006-05-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CWA-2006-05-06 (Central & Western Asia)
- NEP-PBE-2006-05-06 (Public Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Kahn, Charles M & Silva, Emilson C D & Ziliak, James P, 2001. "Performance-Based Wages in Tax Collection: The Brazilian Tax Collection Reform and Its Effects," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(468), pages 188-205, January.
- Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 145-59, January.
- Alejandro Esteller-Moré, 2011. "Is the tax administration just a money machine? Empirical evidence on redistributive politics," Economics of Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 275-299, September.
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