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The Banks' Swansong: Banking and the Financial Markets under Asymmetric Information

Author

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  • Jungu Yang

    (Economic Research Institute, The Bank of Korea)

Abstract

Bank runs may serve to communicate information across agents, and thus enhance rather than thwart allocation efficiency by making the fundamentals determine the asset prices. Figuratively speaking, banks die (go bankrupt) singing a swan song (revealing hidden information). In this way bank runs help uninformed agents to achieve efficient allocation under the condition of asymmetric information in the financial markets. The production of information is done efficiently without cost a point which distinguishes between this paper from most other related studies. The efficiently bank runs provide new ground for the coexistence of banks and financial markets. Even when all agents deposit their whole endowment of goods with the bank, the markets play their role in allocating resources once efficient bank runs happen. Allowing a run implies that investment in liquidity can be minimized, and the expected utility of uninformed agents thus increased. The role of banks is strengthened when agents have limited access to the markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Jungu Yang, 2018. "The Banks' Swansong: Banking and the Financial Markets under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers 2018-16, Economic Research Institute, Bank of Korea.
  • Handle: RePEc:bok:wpaper:1816
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    File URL: http://papers.bok.or.kr/RePEc_attach/wpaper/english/wp-2018-16.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Young Sik Kim & Ohik Kwon, 2019. "Central Bank Digital Currency and Financial Stability," Working Papers 2019-6, Economic Research Institute, Bank of Korea.
    2. Lee, Eun Kyung & Park, Kwangyong, 2021. "Identifying government spending shocks and multipliers in Korea," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    3. Sung Ho Park, 2018. "Fixed-Rate Loans and the Effectiveness of Monetary Policy," Working Papers 2018-20, Economic Research Institute, Bank of Korea.
    4. Youngjin Yun, 2018. "Cross-Border Bank Flows through Foreign Branches: Evidence from Korea," Working Papers 2018-23, Economic Research Institute, Bank of Korea.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial intermediation; Financial markets; Bank runs; Asset price; Asymmetric information; Information acquisition; Limited participation; Liquidity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services

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