Ranking Ranking Rules
AbstractTransitivity is a fundamental requirement for consistency. Legal systems, especially when composed over time and by different agencies, may encounter non-transitive cycles. This paper discusses a new solution to such cycles, namely setting the hierarchy of the relevant rules or preferences. The hierarchy determines the sequence of applying the rules or preferences, and thus enables avoiding non-transitive cycles. The paper provides a formal generalization of this solution, and demonstrates its possible implementation to anti-discrimination laws. It is also shown that this solution can be traced to the Rabbinic literature, starting with the Mishnah and the Talmud (1st–5th c CE).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Boston College Department of Economics in its series Boston College Working Papers in Economics with number 770.
Date of creation: 03 Jan 2011
Date of revision: 27 Feb 2012
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transitivity; cycles; Talmud;
Other versions of this item:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
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