The Redistricting of Public Prosecutors' Offices
AbstractWe analyze the possible impact of re-organizing multiple prosecutors' offices on 'prosecutorial output': merging multiple districts saves on a state's expenditures but the impact on the criminal justice is ambiguous and depends on whether scale efficiencies make up for the diminished resources spent per capita. Data from North Caroline's recent experience with expanding the number of offices is used to test whether scale efficiencies make up for lowered output by looking at the impact of redistricting on multiple measures of prosecutorial output. The evidence suggests that the reorganization creating smaller districts reduced prosecutorial output. This indicates that perhaps consolidation of prosecutorial districts has has been recently suggested will not only lower public expenditure but because of economics of scale may actually lead to enhanced prosecution.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 11-13.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: May 2011
Date of revision:
Caseload; prosecutor; redistricting;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-07-13 (All new papers)
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