Should the Wealthy Be Able to "Buy Justice"?
AbstractThis paper shows that allowing wealthy individuals to influence the outcome of their trials through the purchase of legal services can be consistent with the optimal penalty literature. Using this analysis, the author reviews some of the advantages and disadvantages of varying the length of jail terms versus varying the probability of conviction. Finally, implications for the bail, prosecutorial, and plea bargaining systems are examined. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 95 (1987)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
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- Hugh Gravelle & Nuno Garoupa, .
"Optimal Deterrence with Legal Defence Expenditure,"
00/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Nuno Garoupa & Hugh Gravelle, . "Does Efficient Deterrence Require that the Wealthy Should Be Able to Buy Justice?," Discussion Papers 00/07, Department of Economics, University of York.
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- Thomas J. Miceli, 2009. "Deterrence and Incapacitation Models of Criminal Punishment: Can the Twain Meet?," Working papers 2009-25, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay & Bryan C McCannon, 2011. "The Redistricting of Public Prosecutors' Offices," Discussion Papers 11-13, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
- Goodman, John C. & Porter, Philip, 2002. "Is the criminal justice system just?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 25-39, July.
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"A law and economics perspective on terrorism,"
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