The Behavioural Consequences of Unfair Punishment
AbstractExperimental evidence from public good games with punishment suggests that punishment works when subjects assign it fairly by sanctioning non-cooperators. This paper reports an experiment in which punishment is assigned unfairly in the sense that it is not linked to individual behaviour and is melted out to all group members (irrespective of their prior behaviour). We test whether unfair punishment generates different contribution and punishment behaviour relative to the standard punishment game. Our findings suggest different dynamics of average contributions in the presence of unfair punishment relative to the standard punishment game. Contribution levels are significantly different only when subjects have obtained experience from both games. We also find that, although the assignment of punishment is unaffected after the experience of an environment with unfair punishment, a history of unfair punishment makes a difference regarding reactions to alleviation, reward and punishment received.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Birmingham in its series Discussion Papers with number 10-34.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2010
Date of revision:
Recriprocity; Unfair punishment; Public good experiments;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2010-12-18 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2010-12-18 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2010-12-18 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2010-12-18 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2010-12-18 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2010-12-18 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2010-12-18 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- David Masclet & Laurent Denant-Boèmont & Charles Noussair, 2006.
"Punishment, Counterpunishment and Sanction Enforcement in a Social Dilemma Experiment,"
- Laurent Denant-Boemont & David Masclet & Charles Noussair, 2007. "Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 145-167, October.
- Denant-Boemont, L. & Masclet, D. & Noussair, C.N., 2007. "Punishment, counterpunishment, and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-284310, Tilburg University.
- Michalis Drouvelis & Julian C. Jamison, 2012. "Selecting public goods institutions: who likes to punish and reward?," Working Papers 12-5, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Daniele Nosenzo & Martin Sefton, 2012. "Promoting Cooperation: the Distribution of Reward and Punishment Power," Discussion Papers 2012-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
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