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Coordination and Social Distancing: Inertia in the Aggregate Response to COVID-19

Author

Listed:
  • Mehdi Shadmehr

    (University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy)

  • Ethan Bueno de Mesquita

    (University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy)

Abstract

Social distancing which is critical for mitigating the spread of COVID-19 has been slow and inadequate. Applying the literature on beauty contest models, we show: (1) When a new and rare virus, like COVID-19, emerges, the aggregate level of social distancing has inherent inertia; (2) Clear national public statements are essential in reducing that inertia and adjusting the public's behavior to the new, optimal level of social distancing; (3) National communication is better than local communication when optimal social distancing levels are highly correlated over-time and when individuals are poorly-informed.

Suggested Citation

  • Mehdi Shadmehr & Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, 2020. "Coordination and Social Distancing: Inertia in the Aggregate Response to COVID-19," Working Papers 2020-53, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:bfi:wpaper:2020-53
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Merzoni, Guido & Trombetta, Federico, 2022. "Pandering and state-specific costs of mismatch in political agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 135(C), pages 132-143.
    2. Rahul Deb & Mallesh Pai & Akhil Vohra & Rakesh Vohra, 2022. "Testing alone is insufficient," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 26(1), pages 1-21, March.
    3. Bursztyn, Leonardo & Rao, Akaash & Roth, Christopher & Yanagizawa-Drott, David, 2020. "Misinformation during a Pandemic," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1274, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    4. Leonardo Bursztyn & Aakaash Rao & Christopher Roth & David Yanagizawa-Drott, 2023. "Opinions as Facts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 90(4), pages 1832-1864.
    5. Björn TOELSTEDE, 2022. "Conformity, polarization, and democratic dialogue in times of pathogen threats. Germany and the United States during Covid-19," Eastern Journal of European Studies, Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, vol. 13, pages 263-291, December.
    6. Guido Merzoni & Federico Trombetta, 2021. "A Note on Asymmetric Policies: Pandering and State-specific Costs of Mismatch in Political Agency," DISEIS - Quaderni del Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo dis2102, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia internazionale, delle istituzioni e dello sviluppo (DISEIS).
    7. Aaditya, Bh. & Rahul, T.M., 2021. "Psychological impacts of COVID-19 pandemic on the mode choice behaviour: A hybrid choice modelling approach," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 47-58.

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