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Reglas fiscales subnacionales: Revisión empírica, experiencias internacionales y sus desafíos en la nueva institucionalidad fiscal post COVID

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  • Juan Pablo Jiménez
  • Leonardo Letelier
  • Ignacio Ruelas
  • Jaime Bonet-Morón

Abstract

Durante las últimas dos décadas, la utilización de reglas fiscales ha tenido un aumento significativo alrededor del mundo. Si bien la evidencia internacional ha destacado algunos beneficios a partir de su implementación, las experiencias de América Latina en la puesta en marcha y los resultados han sido heterogéneos. Esas reglas fiscales inicialmente cobijaban a los gobiernos nacionales, pero luego se fueron ampliando a los subnacionales, en parte porque los procesos de descentralización fiscal fueron entregando más responsabilidades en materia de ingreso y gasto público a los gobiernos subnacionales. La revisión de las experiencias internacionales en esta materia provee lecciones de política importantes para futuros cambios en las normas de responsabilidad fiscal nacional y subnacional en los países, en especial ante las condiciones que ha impuesto al sector público la pandemia del COVID-19. Este documento hace una revisión exhaustiva de la evolución de las reglas fiscales subnacionales alrededor del mundo, identificando los principales factores que contribuyen al éxito o fracaso de estas. Además, permite identificar los elementos clave en una posible agenda de reforma ante las fallas en las reglas fiscales que ha visibilizado la actual pandemia. **** ABSTRACT: During the last two decades the use of fiscal rules has increased significantly around the world. Although international evidence has highlighted some benefits from its implementation, the experiences of Latin America in the implementation and the results have been heterogeneous. These fiscal rules initially covered the national governments but were later extended to subnational governments, in part because the fiscal decentralization processes were handing more responsibilities in terms of revenue and public spending to subnational governments. The review of international experiences in this area provides important policy lessons for future reforms in national and subnational fiscal responsibility regulations, especially given the conditions imposed on the public sector by the COVID-19 pandemic. This document makes an extensive review of the evolution of subnational fiscal rules worldwide, identifying the main factors that contribute to their success or failure. In addition, it allows identifying the key elements in a possible reform agenda to face the flaws in the fiscal rules that the current pandemic has made visible.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan Pablo Jiménez & Leonardo Letelier & Ignacio Ruelas & Jaime Bonet-Morón, 2021. "Reglas fiscales subnacionales: Revisión empírica, experiencias internacionales y sus desafíos en la nueva institucionalidad fiscal post COVID," Documentos de trabajo sobre Economía Regional y Urbana 300, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdr:region:300
    DOI: 10.32468/dtseru.300
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Reglas fiscales; gobiernos subnacionales; COVID-19; Fiscal rules; subnational governments; COVID-19;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • R50 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - General

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