Single-Name Credit Risk, Portfolio Risk, and Credit Rationing
AbstractThis paper introduces non-diversifiable risk in the Stiglitz-Weiss adverse selection model, so that an increase in the average riskiness of the borrower pool causes higher portfolio risk. This opens up the possibility of equilibrium credit rationing. Comparative statics analysis shows that an increase in risk aversion turns a two-price equilibrium into a rationing equilibrium. A two-price equilibrium is more inefficient than a rationing equilibrium, and a usury law that rules out the higher of the two interest rates can be welfare-improving. Contrary to the common result, the equilibrium may be characterized by over-investment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Regensburg, Department of Economics in its series University of Regensburg Working Papers in Business, Economics and Management Information Systems with number 448.
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
asymmetric information; credit rationing;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2010-10-30 (Banking)
- NEP-CTA-2010-10-30 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-MIC-2010-10-30 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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FMG Discussion Papers
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- Lensink, Robert & Sterken, Elmer, 2002. "The Option to Wait to Invest and Equilibrium Credit Rationing," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 34(1), pages 221-25, February.
- Arnold, Lutz G., 2005.
"On the Possibility of Credit Rationing in the Stiglitz-Weiss Model,"
University of Regensburg Working Papers in Business, Economics and Management Information Systems
403, University of Regensburg, Department of Economics.
- Lutz G. Arnold & John G. Riley, 2009. "On the Possibility of Credit Rationing in the Stiglitz-Weiss Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2012-21, December.
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- Coco, G., 1997. "Credit Rationing and the Welfare Gain from Usury Laws," Discussion Papers 9715, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
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