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On the Design and Effectiveness of Targeted Expenditure Programs

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Author Info
Ehtisham Ahmad ()
Leo Martinez
Abstract

This paper argues that both horizontal and intertemporal competition among recipient governments are needed in order to ensure incentives for effective utilization of targeted transfers. This has implications for budgeting frameworks and the types of information needed, that might be amenable to formal contracting between the levels of government.

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File URL: http://aysps.gsu.edu/isp/files/ispwp0418.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by International Studies Program, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University in its series International Studies Program Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU with number paper0418.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper0418

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Related research
Keywords: Expenditure Programs; horizontal and intertemporal competition; budgeting;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Holmstrom, Bengt, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 169-82, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Boone, Peter, 1996. "Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 289-329, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Craig Burnside & David Dollar, 2000. "Aid, Policies, and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 847-868, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Bengt Holmstrom, 1999. "Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective," NBER Working Papers 6875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ping Zhang & Ehtisham Ahmad & E. Tandberg, 2002. "On National or Supranational Objectives: Improving the Effectiveness of Targeted Expenditure Programs," IMF Working Papers 02/209, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  6. Li Keping & Ehtisham Ahmad & Thomas J. Richardson & Raju Singh, 2002. "Recentralization in China?," IMF Working Papers 02/168, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-18.

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