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Intertemporal Cournot and Walras Equilibrium: An Illustration

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In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an ineffciency which does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number of strategic Cournot agents implies that the amount of trade (relative to their aggregate consumption) increases (i.e., moving towards the Walrasian amount), but their investment (relative to the stock) decreases (i.e., moving away from the Walrasian amount).

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University in its series Working Papers with number 2132843.

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Handle: RePEc:asu:wpaper:2132843

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Cited by:
  1. Gerhard SORGER, 1995. "Imperfect Competition and Capital Accumulation: The Role of Price Normalization," Vienna Economics Papers vie9506, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  2. Manjira Datta & Leonard Mirman, . "Dynamic Externalities and Policy Coordination," Working Papers 2132841, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.
  3. Indrajit Ray & Herakles Polemarchakis, 2004. "Sunspots, Correlation And Competition," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 89, Royal Economic Society.
  4. Julien, Ludovic A., 2011. "Unemployment equilibrium and economic policy in mixed markets," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 1931-1940, July.
  5. Manjira Datta, . "Externalities and Price Dynamics," Working Papers 9710, Arizona State University, Department of Economics.

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