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Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

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  • Agustin G. Bonifacio

Abstract

By endowing the class of tops-only and efficient social choice rules with a dual order structure that exploits the trade-off between different degrees of manipulability and dictatorial power rules allow agents to have, we provide a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem.

Suggested Citation

  • Agustin G. Bonifacio, 2023. "Trade-off between manipulability and dictatorial power: a proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," Papers 2306.04587, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2306.04587
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 533-544, July.
    2. Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2013. "School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 80-106, February.
    3. Arribillaga, R. Pablo & Massó, Jordi, 2016. "Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(2), May.
    4. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    5. Ninjbat, Uuganbaatar, 2012. "Another direct proof for the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 418-421.
    6. Sen, Arunava, 2001. "Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 381-385, March.
    7. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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