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A Theory of Auditability for Allocation and Social Choice Mechanisms

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  • Aram Grigoryan
  • Markus Moller

Abstract

In centralized mechanisms and platforms, participants do not fully observe each others' type reports. Hence, the central authority (the designer) may deviate from the promised mechanism without the participants being able to detect these deviations. In this paper, we develop a theory of auditability for allocation and social choice problems. Namely, we measure a mechanism's auditabilty as the size of information needed to detect deviations from it. We apply our theory to study auditability in a variety of settings. For priority-based allocation and auction problems, we reveal stark contrasts between the auditabilities of some prominent mechanisms. For house allocation problems, we characterize a class of dictatorial rules that are maximally auditable. For voting problems, we provide simple characterizations of dictatorial and majority voting rules through auditability. Finally, for choice with affirmative action problems, we study the auditability properties of different reserves rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Aram Grigoryan & Markus Moller, 2023. "A Theory of Auditability for Allocation and Social Choice Mechanisms," Papers 2305.09314, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2305.09314
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Federico Echenique & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2015. "How to Control Controlled School Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(8), pages 2679-2694, August.
    2. Orhan Aygün & Inácio Bó, 2021. "College Admission with Multidimensional Privileges: The Brazilian Affirmative Action Case," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 1-28, August.
    3. Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 1999. "Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 16(4), pages 557-567.
    4. Mohammad Akbarpour & Shengwu Li, 2020. "Credible Auctions: A Trilemma," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(2), pages 425-467, March.
    5. Atila Abdulkadiroğlu & Aram Grigoryan, 2021. "Priority-based Assignment with Reserves and Quotas," NBER Working Papers 28689, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Yan Chen & Onur Kesten, 2017. "Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 125(1), pages 99-139.
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    Cited by:

    1. Andreas Bjerre-Nielsen & Lykke Sterll Christensen & Mikkel H{o}st Gandil & Hans Henrik Sievertsen, 2023. "Playing the system: address manipulation and access to schools," Papers 2305.18949, arXiv.org.
    2. Bjerre-Nielsen, Andreas & Christensen, Lykke Sterll & Gandil, Mikkel & Sievertsen, Hans Henrik, 2023. "Playing the System: Address Manipulation and Access to Schools," IZA Discussion Papers 16197, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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