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Does Signaling Solve the Lemon’s Problem?

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  • Timothy Perri

Abstract

Maybe. Lemon’s and signaling models generally deal with different welfare problems, the former with withdrawal of high quality sellers, and the latter with socially wasteful signals. However, with asymmetric information, high productivity workers may not (absent signaling) be employed where they are valued the most. If one’s productivity is known in alternative employment, signaling that overcomes the lemon’s problem at a cost will only occur if it increases welfare. If individual productivity is unknown in alternative employment, again signaling may occur and will overcome the lemon’s problem, but it may lower welfare. Key Words: Lemons, signaling, and sorting

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, Appalachian State University in its series Working Papers with number 13-13.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:apl:wpaper:13-13

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  1. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
  2. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, September.
  3. John G. Riley, 1976. "Informational Equilibrium," UCLA Economics Working Papers 071, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Walter Y. Oi, 1962. "Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 538.
  5. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
  6. Kyungmin Kim, 2012. "Endogenous market segmentation for lemons," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(3), pages 562-576, 09.
  7. Timothy Perri, 2011. "Spence Revisited: Signaling and the Allocation of Individuals to Jobs," Working Papers 11-16, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
  8. Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1993. "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 241-276, August.
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