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Joint bidding and horizontal subcontracting

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  • BOUCKAERT, Jan
  • VAN MOER, Geert

Abstract

This paper investigates joint bidding when firms have incentives to sign subcontracts with each other after competing in the bidding stage. A bidding consortium affects the horizontal subcontracting market and, through backward induction, alters firms’ bids. Our findings challenge the current legal practice that consortia without efficiencies must pass the “no-solo-bidding test”, requiring that its members could not bid stand-alone. Our framework predicts that the formation of a temporary consortium, which has the feature that it dissolves after submitting a losing bid, benefits the procurer. The winning bid is more competitive with a temporary as compared to a structural consortium.

Suggested Citation

  • BOUCKAERT, Jan & VAN MOER, Geert, 2021. "Joint bidding and horizontal subcontracting," Working Papers 2021001, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ant:wpaper:2021001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. BOUCKAERT, Jan & VAN MOER, Geert, 2022. "When rivals team up in procurement: does it distort competition?," Working Papers 2022001, University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Joint bidding; Horizontal subcontracting; buyer power;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices

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