On the probability of breakdown in participation games
AbstractIn this paper I analyze a participation game i.e. a public good game where contributions to the public good are binary (people either participate or not participate). Although variants of this game have been studied extensively, most previous work takes the beneﬁt of provision of the public good to be independent of the number of players that contribute and show that the probability of breakdown, i.e. the probability that no one participates, is increasing in group size. Here this assumption is dropped. I show when the probability of breakdown is decreasing in group size and also present sufficient conditions under which the probability of breakdown is increasing in group size. Moreover I show that for large groups this probability is non-negligible and exceeding exp(−1) in the limit and that the expected number of participants is less than one. Also two economic examples, concerning R&D and debt overhang, are discussed.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance in its series CeNDEF Working Papers with number 07-03.
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Dept. of Economics and Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, NL - 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Phone: + 31 20 525 52 58
Fax: + 31 20 525 52 83
Web page: http://www.fee.uva.nl/cendef/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Pim Heijnen, 2009. "On the probability of breakdown in participation games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 493-511, March.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Mamoru Kaneko & Jacek Prokop, 1991.
"A Game Theoretical Approach to the International Debt Overhang,"
945, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Mamoru Kaneko & Jacek Prokop, 1993. "A game theoretical approach to the international debt overhang," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 1-24, February.
- Joseph E Harrington Jr, 2001. "A Simple Game-Theoretic Explanation for the Relationship Between Group Size and Helping," Economics Working Paper Archive 417, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Anderson, Simon P & Engers, Maxim, 2005.
"Participation Games: Market Entry, Coordination and the Beautiful Blonde,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5241, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Anderson, Simon P. & Engers, Maxim, 2007. "Participation games: Market entry, coordination, and the beautiful blonde," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 120-137, May.
- Thomas R Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, 2001. "A Strategic Calculus of Voting," Levine's Working Paper Archive 563824000000000039, David K. Levine.
- Marco A. Haan & Peter Kooreman, 2003. "How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 509-522, 06.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Cees C.G. Diks).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.