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How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox

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  • Marco A. Haan
  • Peter Kooreman

Abstract

We show that due to free riding of potential voters facing positive voting costs, the proposal with the highest number of supporters can still be the most likely to lose a binary election. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s003550200196
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 20 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (06)
Pages: 509-522

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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:20:y:2003:i:3:p:509-522

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Cited by:
  1. Heijnen, P., 2007. "On the probability of breakdown in participation games," CeNDEF Working Papers 07-03, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
  2. Sanne Zwart, 2010. "Ensuring a representative referendum outcome: the daunting task of setting the quorum right," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 643-677, April.
  3. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2005:i:43:p:1-5 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005. "On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 477-486, 02.
  5. Toolsema, Linda A., 2003. "Having more potential raiders weakens the takeover threat," Research Report 03F16, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
  6. Toolsema, Linda A., 2007. "Having more potential raiders weakens the takeover threat," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 670-685, April.
  7. Sanne Zwart, 2007. "Fixing the Quorum: Representation versus Abstention," Economics Working Papers ECO2007/07, European University Institute.
  8. Tomohiko Kawamori, 2005. "Players' Patience and Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(43), pages 1-5.

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