Bilateralism in Agriculture when Countries use Distorting Domestic Policies
AbstractA recent theoretical research proved that countries always have an incentive to deviate from global free trade when international markets are oligopolistic and when governments are politically biased. This result suggests that global free trade in agriculture (GFTA) cannot be reached as political bias and market power have both been identified. According to May (2011), bilateral agreements could eventually be used as alternative political tools to reach GFTA. This article extends the work of this author to determine whether bilateralism could also lead to GFTA in a realistic world where governments use distorting domestic policies to protect their agricultural sector.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by European Association of Agricultural Economists in its series 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland with number 114657.
Date of creation: 02 Sep 2011
Date of revision:
Bilateral Agreements; Agricultural Trade Liberalization; Distorting Domestic Policies; International Trade Networks.; International Relations/Trade; F12; Q17; Q18;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- Q17 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agriculture in International Trade
- Q18 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Policy; Food Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-10-15 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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